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ABSTRACT 
The digital era invoked new challenges to judicial systems. The  
Internet enabled violation of privacy and intellectual property rights and 
enhanced the magnitude of criminal activity. Recognizing the inability of 
courts to handle a high magnitude of lawsuits, along with enforcement 
difficulties, policymakers worldwide chose to delegate quasi-judicial 
powers to online intermediaries that facilitate or enable such potential 
violations or infringements of rights. Search engines were first tasked to 
perform a quasi-judicial role under a notice-and-takedown regime to 
combat copyright infringement around the world. Recently, the European 
Union (EU) decided to delegate judicial authority to search engines by 
granting rights of erasure, or delisting of personal data, about EU  
individuals under certain circumstances. Effectively, the EU placed 
search engines—mainly Google currently—as a judiciary, tasked to  
balance different fundamental human rights. This privatization of the 
judiciary represents a new paradigm in legal systems and possesses vast 
global ramifications, which must be further scrutinized. 
This Article provides such scrutiny. It begins by briefly exploring 
the rights to be forgotten and delisted. It then provides an overview of the 
quasi-judicial roles played by search engines prior to the new EU rights 
regime and compares them to their new judicial role. Following an  
examination of the pragmatic and normative difficulties in the  
implementation of the EU rights regime, this Article evaluates and  
discusses the future of the private judiciary. It examines the drawbacks 
and benefits of judicial privatization; explores whether other means of 
regulation are more appropriate; and proposes modest solutions to 
properly address the shortcomings of the new privatized judiciary. This 
Article warns against such form of privatization and its current  
implementation, especially when fundamental rights are at stake. If  
policymakers insist on adjudicating search engines, they must also  
restrain their judicial power and provide adequate safeguards for society 
in the form of transparency and proper oversight on both their removal 
procedure and decisions. 
INTRODUCTION 
Digital technology invoked many new challenges to judicial  
systems. The Internet, along with its benefits, created a space in which 
individuals could misuse and violate rights. It made it easier to violate 
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privacy laws, infringe intellectual property rights, and commit crimes. 
Due mainly to financial, enforcement, and other technical difficulties, 
many policymakers worldwide chose to delegate quasi-judicial powers to 
online intermediaries that facilitate or enable such potential violations or 
infringements of rights. To a great extent, it makes sense. The state was 
unable to deal with the enormous number of potential violations that the 
Internet facilitates and thereby created a preliminary process for  
examination of the violation of such rights, while granting a right to  
appeal intermediaries’ decisions to judicial authorities. Under such a 
mechanism, online intermediaries allegedly play merely a quasi-judicial 
role as a preliminary process before the judicial process. However, this 
Article shows that assumption is not always true. 
Online intermediaries—perhaps, mostly search engines—make  
decisions on content based on two factors: internal policy and regulation. 
Filtering search results based on internal policy does not generally  
categorize search engines as a judiciary. As long as search engines  
comply with the law, as private companies, they are entitled to decide 
how to construct their services. Regulation does not also necessarily  
imply that search engines act as a judiciary. While search engines are 
subject to regulation regarding their search results, e.g., removing links 
to illegal content from a search query, they do not generally replace the 
role of courts. But along the way, search engines were tasked with  
making decisions on content removal, which changed their role from a 
preliminary decider to a quasi-judicial entity, and, most recently, in the 
European Union as a judiciary that effectively replaces courts. 
The move to intermediaries acting as quasi-judicial entities began 
in 1998 in the United States under the Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act (DMCA)1 and continued via other forms of regulation worldwide.2 
These forms of regulation created a notice-and-takedown regime to  
combat copyright infringement in which search engines receive requests 
from copyright owners or their representatives to remove search results 
that link to allegedly infringing materials.3 Directly, the DMCA tasked 
search engines with making decisions on intellectual property rights, but 
indirectly, it also enabled them to decide on fundamental rights like free 
speech. Mostly, it triggered a potential paradigm shift: private entities 
that operated online could be delegated with judicial power and  
obligations previously reserved for courts. But such a judicial role is  
limited to a great extent. While fundamental rights are indirectly  
involved in the process, such claims revolve mostly around economic 
                                                     
 1. See infra note 88. 
 2. See infra note 89. 
 3. See infra Part II.A. 
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interests; these rights have more adequate safeguards that rely on  
oversight and transparency and generally comply with the rule of law. 
The EU has recently taken the privatization of the judiciary a step 
further by adopting a right of erasure (right to be forgotten) under the 
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).4 It is a “right of individuals 
to have their data no longer processed and deleted when they are no 
longer needed for legitimate purposes.”5 Prior to its adoption, and until 
the GDPR takes effect after a two-year transition period, the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) granted EU individuals a more limited right to be 
delisted under an interpretation of the Data Protection Directive (DPD).6 
On May 13, 2014, the ECJ held that Google, and more broadly, search 
engine operators, are responsible for the processing of personal data that 
appears on web pages published by third parties. Practically, it means 
that search engines that operate in the EU are obliged to “delist” any  
material that is inadequate, irrelevant, no longer relevant, or excessive in 
relation to those purposes and in the light of the time that has elapsed,7 as 
balanced against the public’s right to the information.8 In other words, 
under the current EU regime, search engines are obliged, under some 
circumstances, to remove search queries related to the search of a  
specific name. 
Under the right to be delisted, search engines are tasked with a  
judicial role. They are obliged by the ECJ to decide which content will 
appear or disappear when someone uses a specific search query related to 
his or her name. If we once referred to search engines as gatekeepers of 
information,9 they have now taken it upon themselves, or rather, have 
been ordered to undertake a new judicial task of balancing between legal 
and fundamental rights: privacy and data protection on the one hand, and 
freedom of speech, freedom of information, and freedom of the press on 
the other. Such a move delegates judicial power to search engines, which 
                                                     
 4. See infra note 29. 
 5. A Comprehensive Approach on Personal Data Protection in the European Union, infra note 
29. 
 6. Directive 95/46/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on 
the Protection of Individuals with regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free  
Movement of such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 [hereinafter EU Data Protection Directive]. 
 7. See Case C–131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD), 
2014 EUR-Lex CELEX 62012CJ0131 (May 13, 2014) [hereinafter Google Spain]. 
 8. Id. 
 9. See, e.g., Niva Elkin-Koren, Let the Crawlers Crawl: On Virtual Gatekeepers and the Right 
to Exclude Indexing, 26 DAYTON L. REV. 179 (2001); Urs Gasser, Regulating Search Engines:  
Taking Stock and Looking Ahead, 9 YALE J.L. & TECH. 201 (2006); Eric Goldman, Search Engine 
Bias and the Demise of Search Engine Utopianism, 8 YALE J.L. & TECH. 188 (2006). 
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now operate as a judiciary in the digital world.10 Their employees are the 
new digital judges, and they now act as a courthouse. 
The judicial-like roles of search engines under the right to be  
delisted enhances and expands the roles of intermediaries in the digital 
era. It constitutes a form of privatization: For-profit, commercial  
entities—not the state—are placed as the judiciary to decide on  
fundamental rights. Indeed, privatization of governmental roles is not 
new in either the digital or kinetic worlds. States sometimes privatize 
some portion of the executive and the legislature by granting authorities 
a prerogative to regulate, allowing private forms of enforcement, and 
even hiring private militaries.11 To some extent, even judicial roles are 
privatized, mainly through Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR)  
procedures12 or a unique procedure commonly referred to as  
“rent-a-judge,” in which parties commission retired judges to make  
binding adjudications.13 But in terms of judiciary privatization, the right 
to be delisted takes two steps forward: It authorizes and obligates  
for-profit commercial entities to balance between fundamental rights and 
liberties with almost no oversight or transparency. Furthermore, it  
impacts the rights of many people that are not parties to the dispute. 
What are the ramifications of this form of privatization? Can  
for-profit organizations serve as adequate judges on fundamental rights 
and liberties? What are the benefits and drawbacks of such an approach 
to human rights and the rule of law? This Article provides a normative 
evaluation of and strives to enrich the discussion on privatization, the 
roles of the judiciary in a democratic society, and the future of the  
Internet under the right to be forgotten and the right to be delisted. 
The Article proceeds as follows: Part I explores the rights that are 
invoked in the new judiciary—the right to be forgotten and the right to 
be delisted under the ECJ ruling. Part II provides an overview of judicial 
roles played by online search engines prior to the right to be delisted and 
compares them to the new judicial role that they play under it. Part III 
scrutinizes the judicial difficulties in the implementation of the right to 
                                                     
 10. Edward Lee argued that under the right to be forgotten, Google is “functioning similar to 
how a government agency or administrative body might act.” Edward Lee, Recognizing Rights in 
Real Time: The Role of Google in the EU Right to Be Forgotten, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1017, 1024 
(2016). This Article argues further that search engines’ role in the right to be delisted (which will be 
further differentiated from the right to be forgotten) resembles judicial decisions made by courts. 
 11. See infra Part III.B. 
 12. For more on ADR of Internet-related disputes, see Jacques de Werra, ADR in Cyberspace: 
The Need to Adopt Global Alternative Dispute Resolution Mechanisms for Addressing the  
Challenges of Massive Online Micro-Justice, SWISS REV. INT’L & EUROPEAN L. (forthcoming, 
2016) (discussing the potential of ADR mechanisms for solving Internet-related disputes in which 
online platforms are challenged by a massive amount of removal requests). 
 13. See infra note 184. 
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be delisted under the new courthouse from both pragmatic and normative 
aspects. Part IV evaluates and discusses the future of the private  
judiciary. It examines the drawbacks and benefits of judicial  
privatization; discusses whether other means of regulation are more  
appropriate; and proposes modest solutions to properly address the  
shortcomings of the new judiciary. Finally, Part V argues that when  
dealing with fundamental rights, the privatization of the judiciary is  
dangerous to both the rule of law and to the existence of a democratic 
society. If any country insists on using search engines as a judiciary, it 
must draw the contours of its judicial power and provide adequate  
safeguards for society. 
I. THE RIGHTS TO BE FORGOTTEN AND DELISTED 
The availability of information has dramatically increased in the 
digital age. Once information is posted online, it could forever orbit the 
digital atmosphere.14 Unlike the limited capacity of the human mind to 
remember everything, the e-memory revolution could enable a never  
forgetting Internet.15 Every picture of us posted, comment made, or video 
uploaded remains there for others to see. Anything that has been openly 
written about us could be accessible at all times by almost anyone with 
access to the Internet. Search engines make this information easily  
accessible to the public. 
Although it would appear optimal to live in an ever-knowing  
society with endless access to information and potential for knowledge, it 
will hardly be utopian. The Internet works well for those individuals who 
can obtain information on anyone without ever meeting him or her. In 
that way, we can fulfill our voyeuristic needs and use it, for example, to 
pre-screen potential dates, pre-screen candidates for jobs, or even learn 
more about our neighbors and people living elsewhere. By the same  
                                                     
 14. See VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER, DELETE: THE VIRTUE OF FORGETTING IN THE 
DIGITAL AGE 50–91 (2009) (arguing that digital technology and storage have led to the demise of 
forgetting). However, it would be false to assume that the Internet never forgets. Information  
persistence research, a field of research dedicated to measuring how long information remains  
accessible and unchanged, suggests otherwise. Various studies on content availability found that 
most online content is not available after one year. See, e.g., Junghoo Cho & Hector Garcia-Molina, 
The Evolution of the Web and Implications for an Incremental Crawler, in PROC. OF THE 6TH INT’L 
CONF. ON VERY LARGE DATA BASES 200–09 (2000); Dennis Fetterly, Mark Manasse, Marc Najork 
& Janet L. Wiener, A Large-Scale Study of the Evolution of Web Pages, 34 SOFTWARE PRAC. & 
EXPERIENCE 213, 213–37 (2004). However, along with technological advancement in various fields, 
e.g., storage capabilities, this might also change in the near future. For a summary of information 
persistence research and conclusions, see Meg Leta Ambrose, It’s About Time: Privacy, Information 
Life Cycles, and the Right to Be Forgotten, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 369, 372–73, 389 (2013). 
 15. For a general overview and discussion of the e-memory revolution, see GORDON BELL & 
JIM GEMMELL, TOTAL RECALL (2009). 
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token, everyone else could be harmed. The fact that online information 
cannot be removed for almost any reason16 is not necessarily good.  
Constantly being under a magnifying glass could prove to be harmful for 
our social opportunities. For example, a picture of a teenager drinking at 
a party could affect her career opportunities for the rest of her natural 
born life.17 Should technological advancements imply that we lost our 
ability to have or regain anonymity?18 Could the Internet lead to a 
“Reputation Bankruptcy”?19 
The concept of digital oblivion is intriguing.20 The digital age  
clearly possesses potential negative ramifications for humankind, which 
should not be completely waived under the auspices of freedom of 
speech and freedom of information. Digital technology allows for  
unprecedented amounts of data collection and retention, which could be 
harmful for our existence.21 However, as many scholars argue, regulation 
in the form of both the right to be delisted and the right to be forgotten 
could endanger freedom of speech, freedom of information, and freedom 
of press.22 It raises concerns of censorship and presents many challenges 
to the framers of such rights. But what perhaps is more intriguing, and 
rarely discussed under the right to be delisted, is the reshaping of roles of 
search engines.23 
But before we delve deep into the right to be forgotten and the ECJ 
ruling on the right to be delisted, we need to briefly understand their  
origins. It all goes back to Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis who  
                                                     
 16. Both information and links to information could be removed under limited circumstance, 
depending on the type of information and the jurisdiction. See infra Part IIA. 
 17. Here are two examples of how online information negatively affected employment of  
individuals. Kimberley Swann, a sixteen-year-old British employee (at that time) at Ivell Marketing 
& Logistics, was fired for moaning on Facebook, “I’m so totally bored!!.” Stacy Snyder posted a 
photo on her Myspace account showing her at a party wearing a pirate hat and drinking from a  
plastic cup along with the caption “Drunken Pirate.” She was fired for promoting drinking in view of 
her under-age students. Andrew Levy, Teenage Office Worker Sacked for Moaning on Facebook 
About Her ‘Totally Boring’ Job, DAILY MAIL (Feb. 26, 2009),  
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1155971/Teenage-office-worker-sacked-moaning-
Facebook-totally-boring-job.html; Jeffrey Rosen, The Web Means the End of Forgetting, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 21, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/25/magazine/25privacy-
t2.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
 18. Briscoe v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, 483 P.2d 34, 41 (Cal. 1971) (“[J]ust as the risk of  
exposure is a concomitant of urban life, so too is the expectation of anonymity regained.”). 
 19. JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET AND HOW TO STOP IT 228–29 (2008). 
 20. See generally MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER, supra note 14. 
 21. See Meg L. Ambrose & Jef Ausloos, The Right to Be Forgotten Across the Pond, 3 J. INFO. 
POL’Y 1, 3 (2013). 
 22. See infra note 143. 
 23. For a brief history of the roles of search engines in the Internet, see, for example, Jonathan 
Zittrain, A History of Online Gatekeeping, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 254 (2006). 
122 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 40:115 
articulated the need for a “right to be let alone.”24 They gave birth to the 
right to privacy. Since then, various forms of privacy rights have  
appeared with different levels of legal protections.25 Over time, and 
mainly after the emergence of digital technologies, the right to privacy 
seemed insufficient to cover many new aspects of our lives. For example, 
it did not sufficiently protect the interests of individuals to control  
information posted online that relates to them. Individuals were in need 
of new legal mechanisms to control the vast amount of information  
posted online. They were in need of a legal right that would enable them 
to decide what personal information may be posted online or available 
via search engines. This gave birth to a new privacy right,26 the so-called 
“right to be forgotten.”27 
A. Right to Be Forgotten (Erasure) 
The right to be forgotten originates from the French and Italian 
“right of oblivion”—le droit à l’oubli and diritto al’ oblio,  
respectively—which censors the facts of an ex-criminal’s conviction and 
                                                     
 24. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 193 
(1890). 
 25. The right to privacy is protected differently around the world. Under United States law, for 
example, while the word “privacy” does not appear in the Constitution, certain aspects of the right to 
privacy are protected by various amendments to the Constitution, and perhaps mainly, by the Fourth 
Amendment. Other than the Constitution, privacy in the United States is protected by various federal 
and state laws, such as the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105–277, 
112 Stat. 2681–728 (1998). The EU—aside from privacy protection in each Member State’s  
constitutions and laws—protects privacy under, inter alia, Article 8 of the Convention for the  
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which provides the protection of “the right 
to respect for [an individual’s] private and family life, his home and his correspondence.”  
(Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 8, Nov. 4, 1950, 
213 U.N.T.S. 221); and by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, article 7  
(protects respect for private and family life) and article 8 (mentioning the protection of personal 
data). See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 18 December 2000,  
O.J. C 364/1–22. 
 26. Few scholars argue that the right to be forgotten should not be treated as a privacy right, 
but rather as a different kind of human right. See, e.g., Napoleon Xanthoulis, The Right to Oblivion 
in the Information Age: A Human-Rights Based Approach, 10 U.S.–CHINA L. REV. 84, 98 (2013) 
(“It is clear that ‘oblivion’ has proven, under certain circumstances, to be a necessity for  
safeguarding human well-being. A right to oblivion confirms the need for a paradigm shift in  
privacy, leading to a multidimensional conceptualization of the right to privacy.”). 
 27. The OECD also recognized in 2013 that “more extensive and innovative uses of personal 
data bring greater economic and social benefits, but also increase privacy risks.” See ORG. FOR 
ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV. (OECD), OECD GUIDELINES OF THE PROTECTION OF PRIVACY 
AND TRANSBORDER FLOWS OF PERSONAL DATA ch. 1, 11 (1980), 
http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/2013-oecd-privacy-guidelines.pdf [https://perma.cc/7F89-
VHUF]. 
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incarceration and is designed to allow rehabilitation.28 In the context of 
online privacy, the right to be forgotten (articulated also as the right of 
erasure) made its debut in the EU as part of the GDPR.29 Proposed by 
Viviane Reding, the European Commissioner for Justice, Fundamental 
Rights, and Citizenship,30 the right to be forgotten enables a data subject 
(an individual) to “obtain from the controller the erasure of personal data 
concerning him or her without undue delay and the controller shall have 
the obligation to erase personal data without undue delay.”31 
Such erasure should occur based on one of the following grounds: 
first, the data is no longer necessary in relation to the purposes for which 
it was collected or otherwise processed;32 second, the data subject  
withdraws consent on which the processing is based and where there is 
no other legal ground for the processing of the data;33 third, the data  
subject objects to the processing of personal data and there are no  
overriding legitimate grounds for the processing,34 or where  
personal data are processed for direct marketing purposes and the data 
subject objects to the processing of his data;35 fourth, the data has been 
unlawfully processed;36 fifth, the data has to be erased for  
                                                     
 28. Jeffrey Rosen, The Right to Be Forgotten, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 88, 88 (2012). A more 
limited description of the right to be forgotten before the passage of the GDPR appeared in Eldar 
Haber, The Cyber Civil War, 44 HOFSTRA L. REV. 41, 63–67 (2015). 
 29. Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 
on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), 
2016 (Apr. 27, 2016) [hereinafter GDPR]. Alex Türk, the French data privacy commissioner, was 
actually first to endorse the creation of a “right to oblivion.” Türk proposed forming an international 
body, which would evaluate removal requests on a case-by-case basis. See Jeffrey Rosen, The  
Deciders: Facebook, Google, and the Future of Privacy and Free Speech, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1525, 1533 (2012). Prior to the GDPR, the right to be forgotten was discussed in a communication of 
the EU in 2010. See A Comprehensive Approach on Personal Data Protection in the European 
Union, at 8, COM (2010) 609 final (Nov. 4, 2010). 
 30. Viviane Reding, Vice-President of the European Comm’n, EU Justice Commissioner, The 
EU Data Protection Reform 2012: Making Europe the Standard Setter for Modern Data Protection 
Rules in the Digital Age (Jan. 22, 2012). See generally Rosen, supra note 28 (exploring the right to 
be forgotten proposal in the EU). 
 31. GDPR, supra note 29, at art. 17. This article will mainly refer to the latest version of the 
GDPR from April 2016. The GDPR defines personal data as: 
Any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’); an 
identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in  
particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location 
data, an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, 
genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person. 
Id. at art. 4(1). 
 32. Id. at art. 17(1)(a). 
 33. See, e.g., id. at art. 6(1)(a), 9(2)(a). Id. at art. 17(1)(b). 
 34. Pursuant to article 21(1). Id. at art. 17(1)(c). 
 35. Pursuant to article 21(2). Id. 
 36. Id. at art. 17(1)(d). 
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compliance with a legal obligation under EU or Member State law to 
which the controller is subject;37 and finally, the collection and/or  
processing of personal data belongs to a child below the age of sixteen.38 
When the GDPR comes into force in early 2018, the EU will grant 
its citizens and residents a right to delete information from the Internet39 
upon meeting these criteria. The GDPR sets five exceptions.40 First, for 
exercising the rights of freedom of expression and information;41 second, 
for compliance with a legal obligation which requires processing of  
personal data under EU or Member State law to which the controller is 
subject, for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest, or 
in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller; third, for  
reasons of public interest in the area of public health;42 fourth, for  
archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or historical research 
purposes, or statistical purposes;43 and finally, for the establishment,  
exercise, or defense of legal claims.44 
The GDPR applies to “data controllers” that “determine the  
purposes and means” of processing personal data. Who are those data 
controllers?45 Beyond search engines, it is currently unclear. Will hosting 
platforms like Facebook have erasure obligations under the GDPR? Only 
time will tell. Whoever will be subject to erasure obligations, violation of 
the right to be forgotten under the GDPR could lead to administrative 
fines up to 20,000,000 EUR, or in the case of an undertaking, up to 4% 
of the total worldwide annual turnover of the preceding financial year, 
whichever is higher.46 Unlike EU Directives, the GDPR is self-executing: 
                                                     
 37. Id. at art. 17(1)(e). 
 38. Depending on the law of the EU Member State, but not below thirteen years old. Id. at art. 
8(1), 17(1)(f). 
 39. While the right to be forgotten is often referred to as a right, it could also be characterized 
as an ethical or social value, or as a virtue or policy aim. See Bert-Jaap Koops, Forgetting  
Footprints, Shunning Shadows. A Critical Analysis of the “Right to Be Forgotten” in Big Data  
Practice, 8 SCRIPTED 229, 231 (2011). 
 40. See GDPR, supra note 29, at art. 17(3). 
 41. In accordance with Article 80. Id. at art. 80.  
 42. In accordance with Article 9(2)(h), (hb) as well as Article 9(4). See id. at art. 17(3)(c). 
 43. Id. at art. 17(3)(d). 
 44. Id. at art. 17(3)(e). 
 45. Under the latest version of the GDPR, data controllers means, 
The natural or legal person, public authority, agency or any other body which alone or 
jointly with others determines the purposes and means of the processing of personal data; 
where the purposes and means of processing are determined by Union law or Member 
State law, the controller or the specific criteria for his nomination may be designated by 
Union law or by Member State law. 
Id. at art. 4(5). 
 46. Id. at art. 83(5). 
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when it comes into force, it will be enforceable as law in all Member 
States.47 
The GDPR was approved in the EU and will soon grant EU  
citizens and residents the lengthily debated right to be forgotten or right 
of erasure. But, the future of such right and how it will be implemented 
in the EU is still highly unclear. What is clear is that the EU recognizes a 
more limited right, which applies to delisting results from search engines 
upon meeting specific criteria. 
B. Right to be Delisted 
A more limited right to be forgotten exists in the EU under national 
data protection laws, as set by the DPD.48 The DPD forms a right to  
access data and conditions the blocking of it. Under the DPD, Member 
States must guarantee that every data subject has the right to obtain from 
the controller49 “the rectification, erasure or blocking of data, when the 
data processing is not in compliance with the Directive and particularly 
in instances where the data are ‘incomplete or inaccurate.’”50 Article 6 
ensures that personal data must be: (1) processed fairly and lawfully; (2) 
collected for specified, explicit, and legitimate purposes, in addition to 
historical, statistical, or scientific purposes;51 (3) adequate, relevant, and 
not excessive in relation to the purposes for which they are collected 
and/or further processed; (4) accurate and, where necessary, kept up to 
date;52 and (5) kept in a form that permits identification of data subjects 
for no longer than is necessary for the purposes for which the data were 
collected or for which they are further processed.53 
The DPD set the grounds for a right to be delisted. Unlike the  
current interpretation of the GDPR, content is not deleted, but rather  
delisted from some search results under certain circumstances. While this 
                                                     
 47. See Regulations, Directives and Other Acts, EUROPA, http://europa.eu/eu-law/decision-
making/legal-acts/index_en.htm [https://perma.cc/679X-H3TM]. 
 48. See EU Data Protection Directive, supra note 6. 
 49. “Controller” under the EU Data Protection Directive means, 
[T]he natural or legal person, public authority, agency or any other body which alone or 
jointly with others determines the purposes and means of the processing of personal data; 
where the purposes and means of processing are determined by national or Community 
laws or regulations, the controller or the specific criteria for his nomination may be  
designated by national or Community law. 
Id. at art. 2. 
 50. Id. at art. 12. 
 51. Provided that Member States provide appropriate safeguards. Id. at art. 6. 
 52. Every reasonable step must be taken to ensure that data that are inaccurate or incomplete, 
having regard to the purposes for which they were collected or for which they are further processed, 
are erased or rectified. Id. at art. 6. 
 53. Personal data stored for longer periods should be stored for historical, statistical, or  
scientific use. Id. at art. 6. 
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Directive has existed since 1995, it was only recently that the ECJ  
revived such right in the digital environment, granting EU citizens and 
residents54 an ability to better control information listed in search  
engines’ results. 
Prior to any normative evaluations of such right, we need to go 
back to the story behind the ECJ ruling. Back in 1998, Mario Costeja 
González’s house was repossessed and put up for auction for the  
recovery of social security debts.55 Under an order of the Spanish  
Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, La Vanguardia Ediciones SL (La 
Vanguardia) published such information in its newspaper, both online 
and offline.56 Since then, when someone Googled Mr. González’s name, 
two links to La Vanguardia’s article, from January and March 1998, 
would appear. Dissatisfied with Google’s results, on March 5, 2010, Mr. 
González lodged a complaint with the Spanish Data Protection Agency 
(Agencia Española de Protección de Datos or AEPD) against La  
Vanguardia, Google Spain, and Google Inc.57 
González requested that La Vanguardia remove or alter those pages 
so that the personal data relating to him no longer appeared. González 
also requested that Google remove or conceal the personal data relating 
to him so that they cease to be included in the search results and no  
longer appeared in links to La Vanguardia. The reason for such requests, 
according to González, was that the context of the attachment  
proceedings concerning him was now entirely irrelevant as it had been 
resolved for a number of years.58 
Under the decision of the AEPD, Google was labeled a data  
controller,59 responsible for removing search results regarding the  
plaintiff.60 Google appealed to Spain’s national high court (Audiencia 
                                                     
 54. Under the Working Party guidelines, a data subject is a citizen or resident of an EU  
Member State. See Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, Guidelines on the Implementation of the 
Court of Justice of the European Union Judgment on “Google Spain and Inc. v. Agencia Espanola 
de Proteccion de Datos (AEPD) and Mario Costeja Gonzalez” C-131/12, 8, WP 225, 1, 3 (Nov. 26, 
2014), http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/ 
files/2014/wp225_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/ALD2-NZ9M] [hereinafter Working Party]. 
 55. Google Spain, supra note 7, ¶ 14. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. ¶ 15. 
 59. Under Section 2(d) of the EU Data Protection Directive which defines controller as: 
[T]he natural or legal person, public authority, agency or any other body which alone or 
jointly with others determines the purposes and means of the processing of personal data; 
where the purposes and means of processing are determined by national or Community 
laws or regulations, the controller or the specific criteria for his nomination may be des-
ignated by national or Community law . . . . 
EU Data Protection Directive, supra note 6, at art. 2(d). 
 60. See Google Spain, supra note 7, ¶¶ 17, 33, 41. Specifically in this case, the AEPD ruled 
that La Vanguardia’s posting was lawful, as “it took place upon order of the Ministry of Labour and 
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Nacional), which asked the ECJ for a preliminary ruling on the right to 
be delisted under the DPD. The ECJ held that search engine operators are 
responsible for their processing of personal data that appears on web 
pages published by third parties. Under the ECJ ruling, processing of 
personal data and the free movement of such data are interpreted as  
“processing of personal data” within the meaning of the DPD when the 
information contains personal data, and search engines61 are “data  
controllers”62 with respect to that processing. Thus, search engines must 
exclude results “where they appear to be inadequate, irrelevant or no 
longer relevant, or excessive in relation to those purposes and in the light 
of the time that has elapsed”63 while they should be “fair[ly] balance[ed]” 
against the public’s right to the information.64 EU citizens and residents 
are entitled to ask search engines to remove the links, and search  
engines—Google in this case—are obliged to remove links to web pages 
that are linked to a search of their name. The exceptions include  
“particular reasons, such as the role played by the data subject in public 
life, . . . justified by the preponderant interest of the general public in 
having . . . access to the information” when such a search is made.65 
Though limited to some extent, the ECJ ruling sets the grounds for 
a narrow version of a “right to be forgotten,” which places liability on 
search engines.66 But such right to be delisted is much narrower in its 
scope. For example, it currently applies only to search engines.67 No  
                                                                                                                       
Social Affairs and was intended to give maximum publicity to the auction in order to secure as many 
bidders as possible.” Id. ¶ 16. 
 61. The scope of the decision, while currently limited to search engines, could expand to other 
intermediaries “whenever the conditions established in the ruling are met.” See Working Party,  
supra note 53, at 8. 
 62. While the ECJ sought the opinion of Advocate General Niilo Jääskinen, which opined that 
Google should not be considered as a “controller” of the personal data appearing on web pages it 
processes, the ECJ concluded that “It is the search engine operator which determines the purposes 
and means of that activity and thus of the processing of personal data that it itself carries out within 
the framework of that activity and which must, consequently, be regarded as the ‘controller’ in  
respect of that processing pursuant to Article 2(d).” See Google Spain, supra note 7, ¶ 33. For the 
opinion of Advocate General Niilo Jääskinen, see Case C-131/12, Opinion of Advocate General 
Jääskinen, 25 June 2013. It should be noted that prior to the ECJ ruling on the right to be delisted, 
the working party opined that search engines are not “primary controllers.” See Working Party, 
supra note 53, at 14. 
 63. See Google Spain, supra note 7, ¶ 93 (emphasis added). 
 64. Id. ¶ 81. 
 65. Id. ¶ 97. 
 66. As noted by the ECJ: “it should be pointed out that the processing of personal data carried 
out in the context of the activity of a search engine can be distinguished from and is additional to 
that carried out by publishers of websites, consisting in loading those data on an internet  
page.” Id. ¶ 35. 
 67. Cf. supra note 61. 
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other intermediary is currently considered a data controller.68 Mainly, 
online content is not deleted, only links for search queries upon searching 
an individual’s name are deleted. Other links to that information will 
continue to exist, and perhaps more importantly, the content itself will 
not be deleted. 
Much has happened since the ECJ ruling. Search engines like 
Google, Yahoo!, and Bing built online mechanisms to exercise a right to 
be delisted mostly under EU domains.69 Not long after, requests began to 
flow in.70 Obligated by the ECJ ruling, and, subsequently, by local data 
protection laws which implemented the DPD, search engines had to 
quickly form an evaluation process to comply with the large number of 
requests sent.71 
The right to be delisted could have global ramifications.72 One of 
the main drawbacks of the right to be delisted is its effect on the role of 
                                                     
 68. However, the Working Party noted in guidelines that “[t]he ruling is specifically addressed 
to generalist search engines, but that does not mean that it cannot be applied to other intermediaries. 
The rights may be exercised whenever the conditions established in the ruling are met.” See Working 
Party, supra note 53, at 17. 
 69. It should be noted that Google currently choses to apply the right to be delisted not only on 
the twenty-eight Member States of the EU but also on the EFTA states (Iceland, Liechtenstein,  
Norway, and Switzerland). See Alastair Jamieson & Emma Ong, Google Opens Privacy Web Form 
for ‘Right To Be Forgotten’ Requests, NBC NEWS (May 30, 2014), 
http://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/google-opens-privacy-web-form-right-be-forgotten-requests-
n118211 [https://perma.cc/57AP-U7KX]. In addition, the right to be delisted may also expand  
beyond the EU, as it has at the beginning of 2016 in Russia. See infra note 254. Also, beyond  
disparities between the right to be forgotten and the right to be delisted, even after over two years 
since the ECJ ruling, much ambiguity exists in the territorial aspect of the right. While search  
engines currently treat the decision of the ECJ as limited to EU domains, the territorial scope of the 
judgment is still unclear. It is mainly unclear whether the individual’s nationality or residence  
matters. Some commentators argued that “there would be no impediment under EU law, for  
example, to a Chinese citizen in China who uses a US-based Internet search engine with a subsidiary 
in the EU asserting the right to be forgotten against the EU subsidiary with regard to results  
generated by the search engine.” See Christopher Kuner, The Right to be Forgotten and the Global 
Reach of EU Data Protection Law, CONCURRING OPINIONS (June 1, 2014), 
http://concurringopinions.com/archives/2014/06/the-right-to-be-forgotten-and-the-global-reach-of-
eu-data-protection-law.html [https://perma.cc/NLL8-9X8B]. 
 70. While data on removal requests are rather limited, I analyze some statistical findings in Part 
IV.B. 
 71. See infra Part II.B. 
 72. The right to be delisted should not be treated as in a vacuum, i.e., that it only effects a 
portion of the world. Mainly, the right to be delisted could expand to include domains beyond the 
EU, such as Google.com. See infra note 145. In addition, the right to be delisted will also highly 
effect the U.S.–EU Safe Harbor Agreement as long as the agreement exists. Under this agreement, 
the EU enables the exporting of personal data from its domain only when U.S.-based privacy  
policies are adequate. See U.S.–EU Safe Harbor Overview, EXPORT, 
https://build.export.gov/main/safeharbor/eu/eg_main_018476 (last updated Dec. 18, 2013) 
[https://perma.cc/2UNX-28JQ]. For a similar argument, see Michael L. Rustad & Sanna Kulevska, 
Reconceptualizing the Right to Be Forgotten to Enable Transatlantic Data Flow, 28 HARV. J.L. & 
TECH. 349, 386–87 (2015). 
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the judiciary. The ECJ effectively endowed search engines with the  
power to decide which links will remain online and which will not; it 
gave search engines the power to decide which fundamental rights  
prevail: privacy and data protection or freedom of speech, freedom of 
information, and freedom of the press. Essentially, search engines have 
become judges that adjudicate fundamental rights and liberties. 
II. THE NEW JUDICIARY IN THE DIGITAL WORLD 
Prior to the emergence of the right to be delisted, and depending on 
the legal system in question, controlling the flow of information online 
was mostly limited to intellectual property restrictions, defamation 
claims, contractual obligations, and privacy torts.73 The new right to be 
delisted, which tasked search engines to deal with a new type of claim, 
must be balanced against other fundamental rights before exercised.  
Effectively, the ECJ shifted enforcement and adjudication to for-profit 
commercial entities, which are not necessarily equipped or accountable 
to make such decisions. On the normative side, this move could lead to a 
paradigmatic shift in jurisprudence, transferring the traditional function 
of adjudication from public officials to private entities.74 
Such judiciary privatization raises both pragmatic and normative 
difficulties that should be scrutinized. But prior to such evaluation, we 
first need to understand to what extent the ECJ ruling changed the roles 
of search engines. Is this indeed a new judicial role? What current legal 
obligations and practices apply to search engines that could also be  
labeled as adjudicative? How is such right different from current removal 
practices of search engines? In order to answer such questions, Part II.A 
will summarize and evaluate the judicial roles that search engines have 
played thus far in the digital world, mainly focusing on Google.75 
                                                     
 73. See Leta Ambrose, supra note 14, at 375. See generally Eugene Volokh, Freedom of 
Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop Others from  
Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1049 (2000). 
 74. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 235, 235 (1979) (reviewing the traditional roles of courts). 
 75. While various search engines currently exist, Google has unrivalled dominance in the 
search engine sector, with the most significant market share (as of October 2015, 89.2% of the  
global market), and therefore in many times will be used in this article as a key-example of search 
engines. For updated statistics on search engines’ market share, see Worldwide Market Share of 
Leading Search Engines from January 2010 to October 2015, STATISTA, 
http://www.statista.com/statistics/216573/worldwide-market-share-of-search-engines (last visited 
Jan. 17, 2016) [https://perma.cc/64Y7-UGSU]. 
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A. Quasi-Judicial Roles of Search Engines 
The role that search engines play in the digital environment is  
debatable.76 Google’s announced search philosophy is that “[s]earch 
should reflect the whole web.”77 In practice, this philosophy hardly 
matches their actions. Search engines are not always neutral to content.78 
Google commonly filters search results.79 Their algorithm, known as 
PageRank,80 is a combination of regulation and internal policies.81 The 
algorithm of each search engine decides, inter alia, which results will 
appear or not appear and how they will be ranked. As long as search  
engines comply with their legal obligations, they can construct the  
algorithm in any manner they desire. Thus, Google makes decisions on 
content depending on two factors: regulation and its own policy. 
The first part is regulation. Even prior to the right to be delisted, 
and well beyond the European borders, search engines like Google were 
subject to regulation regarding their search results. Such regulation  
obviously depends on different legal systems and jurisdictions, but can 
be generally divided into three categories: sensitive information,  
copyrighted materials, and governmental requests. 
Under the legal category of sensitive information, Google will  
generally remove links to content that includes child sexual abuse  
imagery.82 But Google is also subjected to domestic laws, which obligate 
                                                     
 76. Some scholars opine that search engines should play a role of a neutral conduit, while 
others opine that they play a role of an active and opinionated editor. Whether search engines like 
Google should be treated as a “conduit” or an “editor,” and thereby could be subject to speech  
regulation, extends beyond the scope of this article. For an overview and analysis of such views, see 
James Grimmelmann, Speech Engines, 98 MINN. L. REV. 868 (2014). 
 77. See “Revenge Porn” and Search, GOOGLE PUB. POL’Y BLOG, 
http://googlepublicpolicy.blogspot.co.il/2015/06/revenge-porn-and-search.html [https://perma.cc/ 
ZUP6-Y9UM]. 
 78. Google decides on our freedom to access information. Google can place anyone  
down-the-list, in a manner which the information is inaccessible de facto. For a discussion on 
whether search engines are neutral, see James Grimmelmann, The Structure of Search Engine Law, 
93 IOWA L. REV. 1 (2007); Uta Kohl, Google: The Rise and Rise of Online Intermediaries in the 
Governance of the Internet and Beyond (Part 2), 21 INT’L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 187, 190–97 (2013); 
Goldman, supra note 9. 
 79. See generally Dawn C. Nunziato, The Death of the Public Forum in Cyberspace, 20 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1115 (2005). 
 80. Google Fun Facts, INTERNET ARCHIVE (Apr. 24, 2009), http://web.archive.org/ 
web/20090424093934/http://www.google.com/press/funfacts.html [https://perma.cc/BAV8-2KTG]. 
 81. Regulation of search engines experienced a respectable amount of academic discussion 
much prior to the emergence of the right to be forgotten and the right to be delisted. For examples of 
such scholarship, see Lucas Introna & Helen Nissenbaum, Shaping the Web: Why the Politics of 
Search Engines Matters, 16 INFO. SOC’Y 169 (2000); Frank Pasquale, Rankings, Reductionism, and 
Responsibility, 54 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 115 (2006); Elkin-Koren, supra note 9; Gasser, supra note 9; 
Goldman, supra note 9; Grimmelmann, supra note 78. 
 82. See Removal Policies, GOOGLE, https://support.google.com/websearch/answer/2744324 
(last visited Jan. 20, 2016) [https://perma.cc/5LRL-QJSZ]. 
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it to remove search results in other instances as well.83 For example,  
under the German and French versions of Google, it is forbidden to  
include sites containing extremist content, inter alia, featuring hate 
speech and Holocaust denial.84 Pornography is blocked in many  
countries, especially child pornography.85 Google Thailand filters sites 
and videos which might “Lése-majesté,” i.e., insult Thailand’s King.86 In 
EU Member States, under the obligation of the directive of electronic 
commerce, search engines are obliged to remove defamatory materials 
upon notice.87 
Search engines also receive requests to remove links to websites 
that presumably infringe copyright, set under the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act (DMCA)88 in the United States and the Electronic  
                                                     
 83. For a full overview of regulatory requirements on search engines, see Kohl, supra note 78. 
 84. See Jonathan Zittrain & Benjamin Edelman, Statement of Issues and Call for Data, 
HARVARD (Oct. 26, 2002), http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/filtering/google [https://perma.cc/BY3Y-
H9R4]; Letter from Peter Fleischer of Google to Isabelle Falque-Pierrotin, Chair, Article 29 Work-
ing Party, at 3, (July 31, 2014), https://docs.google.com/a/kentlaw.iit.edu/file/d/ 
0B8syaai6SSfiT0EwRUFyOENqR3M/preview [https://perma.cc/Y943-DFU2] [hereinafter Letter 
from Peter Fleischer]. However, upon a relevant search, Google indicates the number of excluded 
results and refers to Lumen (previously known as Chilling Effects) for further explanation. For more 
on Lumen, see infra note 107. 
 85. Andy Greenberg, Where Google Still Censors, FORBES (Jan. 21, 2010), 
http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2010/0208/outfront-technology-china-where-google-still-
censors.html; Danny Friedmann, Paradoxes, Google and China: How Censorship Can Harm and 
Intellectual Property Can Harness Innovation, in EMPIRICAL APPROACHES TO LEGAL ASPECTS OF 
KNOWLEDGE-ECONOMY BUSINESS MODELS 303, 307 (Aurelio Lopez-Tarruella ed., 2012). 
 86. Greenberg, supra note 84; Friedmann, supra note 84, at 307. 
 87. See Council Directive 2000/31, 2000 O.J. (L 178) 1 (EC) art. 12–14. The UK inserted such 
provision prior to the introduction of the E-Commerce Directive. See Defamation Act 1952, 15 & 16 
Geo. 6 & 1 Eliz. 2, c. 66, § 1(1) (Eng.) (amended by Defamation Act of 1996); Kohl, supra note 78, 
at 198. 
 88. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 (DMCA), codified as 17 U.S.C. §§ 512, 
1201–1205, 1301–1332; 28 U.S.C. § 4001 (2012). Under the DMCA, a service provider will not be 
held liable for monetary relief, for injunctive or other equitable relief, or for infringement of  
copyright by reason of the provider’s transmitting, routing, or providing connections for material 
through a system or network controlled or operated by or for the service provider, or by reason of the 
intermediate and transient storage of that material in the course of such transmitting, routing, or 
providing connections, if the transmission of the material was initiated by or at the direction of a 
person other than the service provider; the transmission, routing, provision of connections, or storage 
is carried out through an automatic technical process without selection of the material by the service 
provider; the service provider does not select the recipients of the material except as an automatic 
response to the request of another person; no copy of the material made by the service provider in 
the course of such intermediate or transient storage is maintained on the system or network in a 
manner ordinarily accessible to anyone other than anticipated recipients, and no such copy is  
maintained on the system or network in a manner ordinarily accessible to such anticipated recipients 
for a longer period than is reasonably necessary for the transmission, routing, or provision of  
connections; and the material is transmitted through the system or network without modification of 
its content. See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2012); Niva Elkin-Koren, Making Technology Visible: Liability of 
Internet Service Providers for Peer-to-Peer Traffic, 9 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 15, 16 (2006). 
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Commerce Directive in the EU.89 Under this “notice-and-takedown”  
regime to combat copyright infringement, search engines (and other 
online intermediaries) receive requests from copyright owners or their 
representatives to remove search results that link to such allegedly  
infringing materials.90 Under the U.S. version of notice-and-takedown, 
intermediaries must respond “expeditiously” to notices of infringement 
by removing or disabling access to allegedly infringing material when 
certain conditions are met.91 Other hosting services—not search  
engines—must promptly notify the subscriber that it has removed or  
disabled access to the material and forward any counter notices from  
alleged infringers back to the original complainant.92 If a lawsuit has not 
been filed after ten to fourteen days following receipt of the counter  
notice, the intermediary reinstates the contested material.93 In exchange 
for compliance, search engines receive a safe harbor from liability for 
Internet users’ acts of copyright infringement and for any mistaken  
removal of materials done in good faith.94 
The last form of regulation, operates under “governmental  
requests.” Search engines like Google regularly receive requests from 
courts and government agencies around the world to remove links to 
content.95 As national security plays a role in many of these requests, 
much secrecy lies within this form of adjudication. But Google does  
provide a few examples. For example, in 2014 Google received a request 
from Roscomnadzor, a federal executive body in Russia, to remove a 
Blogger blog post discussing jihad in Russia’s North Caucasus region.96 
The second part is policy.97 Beyond their legal obligations, search 
engines make decisions. These decisions vary among search engines. 
Google sometimes enables the removal of various types of personal  
information: contact information (such as an email address or a 
username); nonconsensual personal pictures which are sexually explicit; 
                                                     
 89. See Council Directive 2000/31, 2000 O.J. (L 178) 1 (EC), supra note 87 at art. 14. 
 90. In January 2016, in only one-month period, Google received 72,784,574 URLs requests to 
be removed for alleged copyright infringement. For statistical data on such removal requests in 
Google, see Transparency Report, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/transparencyreport/ 
removals/copyright/?hl=en [https://perma.cc/HM6J-4ZWP]. 
 91. 17 U.S.C §§ 512(b)(2)(E)(i)–(ii), 512(c)(1)(C) (2012). In addition, the DMCA requires 
intermediaries to adopt and reasonably implement a policy to terminate the accounts of repeat  
infringers and must notify users of this plan, while also accommodate “standard technical measures” 
used by copyright owners to identify infringing material. See id. §§ 512(a)–(b), (d), (c), (i). 
 92. Id. §§ 512(g)(2)(A)–(B). 
 93. Id. § 512(d). 
 94. Id. §§ 512(c)(1)(A)–(B), (g)(1). 
 95. See Transparency Report, supra note 90. 
 96. Id. 
 97. For an empirical study of Google removal of content policy, see generally Jane R.  
Bambauer & Derek E. Bambauer, Vanished, 18 VA. J.L. & TECH. 137 (2013). 
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government-issued ID numbers; a bank account or credit card number; a 
pornographic site that contains a full name or business name; and images 
of handwritten signatures.98 Under its advertising policy, Google does 
not allow “the promotion of some products or services that cause  
damage, harm, or injury.”99 It sometimes delists socially relevant content 
that could harm autonomy, reputation, and emotional well-being, under 
some circumstances.100 Google also offers a “SafeSearch” feature, which 
offers to block inappropriate or explicit images from Google’s Search 
results.101 Recently, Google decided to add “revenge porn” to its  
potential delisting possibilities for search results worldwide.102 
It is evident that search engines, like Google, already make  
judgments regarding content in their services. Many of these judgments 
should not be confused with judgments of a judiciary; compliance with 
internal policies is not judicial in nature. Other parts of the process are 
largely judicial in nature. Perhaps mainly, governmental requests and 
copyright infringement claims mandated by some regulators could be 
viewed as placing search engines and other intermediaries in a judicial 
role.103 After all, they must make decisions on matters that relate to legal 
rights. 
The notice-and-takedown regime has many flaws that are beyond 
the scope of this Article. In terms of judicial aspects, the decisions that 
intermediaries make under this regime are judicial in nature. They do not 
merely decide on an economic controversy but also affect fundamental 
                                                     
 98. Remove Information from Google, GOOGLE, https://support.google.com/websearch/ 
troubleshooter/3111061#ts=2889054%2C2889099 [https://perma.cc/A3BT-VRMQ]. 
 99. Google provides examples of such products and services that they consider to be  
dangerous: explosives; guns & parts; dangerous knives; other weapons (any other product that is 
designed to (in modern-day usage) injure an opponent in sport, self-defense, or combat); recreational 
drugs & drug-related equipment; and tobacco products & related equipment. Advertising Policies 
Help, GOOGLE, https://support.google.com/adwordspolicy/answer/6014299?hl=en [https://perma.cc/ 
DD7Q-6RW5]. 
 100. Woodrow Hartzog & Evan Selinger, Google Acknowledges, Revenge Porn Will Remain 
Available on Websites, but Delisting It from Search Engines Can Make Information Harder to  
Access, GUARDIAN (June 25, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/jun/25/googles-
revenge-porn-opens-right-forgotten-us [https://perma.cc/M3ML-Q349]. 
 101. Turn SafeSearch On or Off, GOOGLE, https://support.google.com/websearch/ 
answer/510?hl=en [https://perma.cc/HEN6-UK45]. 
 102. Joanna Walters, Google to Exclude ‘Revenge Porn’ from Internet Searches, GUARDIAN 
(June 21, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/jun/20/google-excludes-revenge-
porn-internet-searches [https://perma.cc/744D-4Z25]. 
 103. Cf. Jennifer M. Urban & Laura Quilter, Efficient Process or Chilling Effects - Takedown 
Notices Under Section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & 
HIGH TECH. L.J. 621, 639 (2006) (arguing that notice-and-takedown under the DMCA “constitutes 
an extrajudicial temporary restraining order”). 
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rights like free speech.104 Many of the intermediaries use automated  
processes, which could pose even greater dangers to these rights.105 
Among others, this quasi-judicial process raises concerns of transparency 
and accountability.106 
However, such a judicial role is much more limited in scope than 
the right to be delisted. Transparency exists, to some extent, when  
hosting services notify subscribers that they have removed or disabled 
access to materials. There are also projects, like Lumen (previously 
known as Chilling Effects), that enhance transparency by collecting and 
publishing cease-and-desist notices from a variety of sources, including 
all notices received by Google.107 Most importantly, both sides, and  
usually even other interested parties, are granted an ability to take this 
controversy to court. Thus, in terms of privatization, search engines (and 
other intermediaries) under the DMCA’s notice-and-takedown regime 
should be generally labeled as quasi-judicial entities. 
B. The New Judicial Role of Search Engines 
To understand the judicial role that search engines play under the 
right to be delisted, we need to review the process. It begins with an EU 
citizen or resident, characterized as a data subject, who, upon discovering 
that his fundamental rights under Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter have 
been infringed upon, is entitled to approach the search engine with an 
online removal request.108 These requests, which usually occur through a 
web form,109 must clarify why a URL in the search engine’s results is 
                                                     
 104. See, e.g., Theresa A. Lyons, Scientology or Censorship: You Decide, an Examination of 
the Church of Scientology, Its Recent Battles with Individual Internet Users and Service Providers, 
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, and the Implications for Free Speech on the Web, 2 RUTGERS 
J.L. & RELIGION 1, 1 (2000). 
 105. For a general analysis of intermediaries’ use of algorithmic enforcement under the 
DMCA, see Maayan Perel & Niva Elkin-Koren, Accountability in Algorithmic Enforcement:  
Lessons from Copyright Enforcement by Online Intermediaries, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. (forthcom-
ing 2016). 
 106. For a general overview of transparency and accountability under the DMCA and  
intermediaries use of algorithmic enforcement, see id. 
 107. See generally LUMEN, https://lumendatabase.org [https://perma.cc/5MFP-GWSC]. 
 108. The Working Party did not specify which specific mechanisms search engines should 
implement, but indicated that “online procedures and electronic forms, may have advantages and 
would be advisable because of its convenience.” See Working Party, supra note 53, at 7. Google 
does not generally provide an alternative process for submitting a removal request (e.g., by fax, 
letter, and email). However, it does note that if a requester insists on not using the web form, Google 
will process his or her request. See Letter from Peter Fleischer, supra note 83, at 7. 
 109. This is how Google removal process currently works: first, the data subject is required to 
select the country (currently out of thirty-three states) whose law applies to his request. Then, the 
data subject provides the name used to search, which he wishes to delist, and provides his full name, 
even if making the request on behalf of someone else who he is authorized to represent, and contact 
email address. The data subject then must provide the URLs for the web pages that the result links 
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irrelevant, outdated, or otherwise inappropriate.110 At this point, the 
search engine is required to examine whether the data subject has the 
abovementioned right and whether his right overrides their economic 
interest and the interest of the general public in having access to that  
information upon conducting a search relating to his name.111 
While the ECJ did not specify what constitutes interests of the  
general public, it provided some criteria for examining requests: the  
nature or sensitivity of the information; public interest; the role played by 
the data subject in public life;112 and the time elapsed.113 While not 
obliged by the court, search engines will usually notify the website that 
the link was removed, but the website generally cannot object to a search 
engine’s decision.114 If the search engine decides to decline the removal 
request, after providing sufficient information on the grounds of the  
refusal,115 the data subject can request that a “supervisory authority,”116 
which in most cases will be the local data protection authority (DPA), 
review the decision.117 They can also file an appeal to the relevant  
judicial authority.118 Otherwise, the search engine will remove the  
requested URLs from a list displayed following a search made on the 
                                                                                                                       
to. For each URL, the data subject is required to explain how the linked URL relates to him and why 
the inclusion of that URL in search results is irrelevant, outdated, or otherwise objectionable. The 
data subject is then required to attach a legible copy of a document that verifies his identity (or the  
identity of the person whom he is authorized to represent). Finally, the data subject or his  
representative signs the form by typing his full name and providing the date of the request. See 
Search Removal Request Under Data Protection Law in Europe, GOOGLE, 
https://support.google.com/legal/contact/lr_eudpa?product=websearch [https://perma.cc/9B5N-
L29U]. Yahoo!’s process also begins with filling in a form and uploading a document verifying the 
identity of the requester. In making the decision, Yahoo! is “taking into consideration numerous 
factors, including the number, nature and complexity of the requests we receive.” See Requests to 
Block Search Results in Yahoo Search: Resource for European Residents, YAHOO!, 
https://uk.help.yahoo.com/kb/SLN24378.html [https://perma.cc/YK9N-AESJ]. 
 110. See for example, in Google, where the removal request also demands, inter alia, a copy of 
a valid form of photo ID, personal details, and links associated that you want removed. Search  
Removal Request Under Data Protection Law in Europe, supra note 108. 
 111. Google Spain, supra note 7. 
 112. Id. ¶ 81. 
 113. Id. ¶ 93. 
 114. For an example of how Google exercised the right to be delisted on six articles published 
on the Guardian website, see James Ball, EU’s Right to Be Forgotten: Guardian Articles Have Been 
Hidden by Google, GUARDIAN (July 2, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/ 
jul/02/eu-right-to-be-forgotten-guardian-google [https://perma.cc/76KD-M7LZ] 
 115. See Working Party, supra note 53, at 7. 
 116. Google Spain, supra note 7, ¶ 77. 
 117. Id. ¶ 77. Frequently Asked Questions, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/ 
transparencyreport/removals/europeprivacy/faq/?hl=en#how_does_googles_process [https://perma. 
cc/CAE4-ZGKA]. Any formal claims should be envisaged by Article 28(4) of the Directive and 
treated by DPAs under their national legislation in the same manner as all other claims for  
mediation. See EU Data Protection Directive, supra note 6; Working Party, supra note 53, at 11. 
 118. Google Spain, supra note 7, ¶ 77. 
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basis of the data subject’s name. In some instances, the search engine, 
upon displaying name-based queries that were affected by the decision, 
will place a notification at the bottom of the search results indicating that  
results may have been removed.119 
We can learn from the experience of Google about how such  
judicial processes works. As mentioned, the removal process necessitates 
human intervention. Every removal request must be thoroughly  
examined by a human examiner before making a decision.120 Google, for 
example, has formed a team of specially trained reviewers who use  
“dedicated escalation paths to senior staff and attorneys at Google to  
adjudicate on difficult and challenging cases.”121 While, in most cases, a 
single examiner is sufficient for deciding on a request, in some instances 
there would be multiple examiners for a single request.122 
How do examiners review removal requests? Put differently: How 
does the Google courthouse operate? Two months after the ECJ ruling 
Google appointed an advisory council to aid in the determination of  
removal requests.123 This advisory council consisted of experts, mostly 
external to Google, who reached out to the public for input.124 Over time, 
Google has carefully developed criteria125 in partial alignment with  
Article 29 of the Working Party’s guidelines (Working Party).126 
                                                     
 119. See Letter from Peter Fleischer, supra note 83, at 10 (“With regards to the CJEU decision, 
our current approach is to show a notification at the bottom of all search result pages for queries 
where a name-based removal has occurred as well as for all other search result pages that appear to 
be for the name of a person, indicating that results may have been removed.”). The main exception, 
according to Mr. Fleischer, are “celebrities and other public figures,” which, according to Fleischer, 
“are very rarely affected by a removal, due to the role played by these persons in public life.”  
However, it should be noted that such practice is unlikely to continue in the EU, as it might  
jeopardize the rationales behind the right to be delisted. Id. 
 120. See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 116; Letter from Peter Fleischer, supra note 
84, at 7 (“We are not automating decisions about these [right to be delisted] removals. We have to 
weigh each request individually on its merits, and that is done by people.”). 
 121. See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 116. 
 122. As of November 1, 2015, just over 30% of requests had been escalated for a second  
opinion. See id. 
 123. See Natasha Lomas, Google Seeks to Shape Public Debate on Europe’s Right to Be  
Forgotten Ruling, TECHCRUNCH (July 11, 2014), http://techcrunch.com/2014/07/11/google-agitates-
for-public-debate-on-europes-right-to-be-forgotten-ruling [https://perma.cc/G9UT-7CWK]. 
 124. See Google Advisory Council, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/advisorycouncil 
[https://perma.cc/S7SH-5WFZ]. In January 2015, Google’s Council published its findings and  
recommendations in a report. LUCIANO FLORIDI, ET. AL, REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO 
GOOGLE ON THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN, https://buermeyer.de/wp/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/ 
Report-of-the-Advisory-Committee-to-Google-on-the-Right-to-be-Forgotten.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
5PV2-2PCU]. 
 125. See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 116. 
 126. EU Data Protection Directive, supra note 6, art. 29; The Working Party consists of “a 
representative of the supervisory authority or authorities designated by each Member State and of a 
representative of the authority or authorities established for the Community institutions and bodies, 
and of a representative of the Commission.” See id. at art. 29(2); Working Party, supra note 53. 
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The process of evaluation consists of four stages.127 First, the  
“examiner” determines whether the request contains necessary  
information for Google to reach a decision. In cases where an individual 
files a request that does not contain sufficient information for Google to 
make a decision, the examiner would ask for supplementary information 
to support the evaluation.128 Second, Google examines whether the  
person making the request has a connection to a European country, such 
as residency or citizenship.129 It verifies identity by requiring personal 
documents such as driver’s licenses or national ID cards.130 Third, 
Google examines the pages that appear in search results for the  
requester’s name and ascertains whether the requester’s name appears on 
the page(s) requested for delisting.131 Finally, Google decides whether the 
page requested for removal includes information that is inadequate,  
irrelevant, no longer relevant, or excessive (in relation to the purposes of 
the processing at issue) based on the information that the requester  
provides and whether there is a public interest in such information.132 
Thus, Google becomes the judge and jury with respect to the right 
to be delisted.133 Arguably, Google only plays the role of a preliminary 
decider before individuals take their cases either to the court or to the 
local DPA. However, as this Article further argues, from a legal realism 
point of view, Google serves as a de facto court due mainly to two  
factors: the inability to challenge approved requests and the practice of 
appeal for rejected ones. 
The first reason Google serves as a de facto court is the inability to 
challenge approved requests. The process generally resembles an ex 
parte procedure, meaning that not all parties to the controversy are  
present.134 If Google approves a request, there is no appeal, as the only 
                                                     
 127. See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 116. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Such requirement is placed to verify identity, as Google has told media outlets it “often 
receives fraudulent removal requests from people impersonating others, trying to harm competitors, 
or improperly seeking to suppress legal information.” Caitlin Dewey, Want to Remove our Personal 
Search Results from Google? Here’s How the Request Form Works, WASH. POST (May 30, 2014), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-intersect/wp/2014/05/30/want-to-remove-your-personal-
search-results-from-google-heres-how-the-request-form-works [https://perma.cc/LMA3-3FPA]. 
 131. See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 116. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Ann Cavoukian & Christopher Wolf, Sorry, but There’s No Online “Right to Be  
Forgotten”, NAT’L POST (June 25, 2014), http://news.nationalpost.com/full-comment/ann-
cavoukian-and-christopher-wolf-sorry-but-theres-no-online-right-to-be-forgotten [https://perma.cc/ 
KA4X-LSNF] (“The European Court of Justice has mandated that the Googles of the world serve as 
judge and jury of what legal information is in the public interest, and what information needs to be 
suppressed because the facts are now dated and the subject is a private person.”). 
 134. See Lee, supra note 10, at 45. 
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interested party who is aware of the process is the requester who received 
her wish to be delisted. Under this process, other interested parties,  
including the publisher of the content, interested members of society, and 
practically every person that uses the search engine, cannot appeal. 
Therefore, Google does not play the role of a preliminary administrative 
authority, but rather that of a secret judiciary. 
Next we have the practice of appeal for rejected requests. One  
example is Italy. Up until December 2, 2015, the total number of  
“delisting” requests to Google Italy was 27,478.135 The number of URLs 
which were requested for removal was 89,693.136 Google rejected to  
remove 70% of such URLs (51,877).137 In more than a year and a half, 
how many of these cases were taken to the Italian DPA?  
Sixty.138 We can see similar outcomes in other DPAs,139 and while statis-
tics of court filings are not widely available, they are likely to be even 
lower than DPA requests.140 The number of appeals appears to be low for 
individuals who are trying to preserve their rights.141 But some caution 
should be taken here, prior to making any normative claims. While the 
number of appeals to DPAs is currently low, this practice could change 
over time, as the right to be delisted is fairly new. More importantly, it is 
difficult to assess how many URLs were requested for removal by each 
individual who appealed. While highly unlikely, the sixty appeals to the 
Italian DPA could represent all the rejected URLs. All in all, with these 
caveats in mind, it seems that pragmatically, even if search engines like 
                                                     
 135. See European Privacy Requests for Search Removals, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/ 
transparencyreport/removals/europeprivacy/?hl=en [https://perma.cc/WRM5-75WU]. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Unfortunately, Google does not currently publish the percentage of rejected requests, 
which may include multiple URLs. See id. 
 138. The Italian DPA resolved fifty complaints (and approved one-third) while ten complaints 
were still being examined at that time. See Rocco Panetta, Right to Be Forgotten: The Italian DPA 
Has Resolved 50 Complaints After the Known Google Spain Decision, NCTM (Dec. 2, 2015), 
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=a799812c-4961-42cd-aefd-191070af41e3 
[https://perma.cc/Q97Q-RBFL]. 
 139. Take Spain as another example. As of October 8, 2015, the Spanish data protection  
agency has received 325 requests, which represent 1.7% of the Spanish data subjects that received a 
rejection. Most member states DPAs received less than one hundred requests so far, and in five 
member states DPAs received less than ten. See Peter Teffer, Europeans Give Google Final Say on 
‘Right to be Forgotten’, EUOBSERVER (Oct. 8, 2015), https://euobserver.com/investigations/130590 
[https://perma.cc/4J7B-CF6X]. 
 140. For a similar argument, see Lee, supra note 10, at 22 (“The low rate of appeals of 
Google’s rejections to national DPAs thus far suggests that the rate of lawsuits in court will be even 
lower.”). 
 141. Traditionally in the United States, for example, approximately fifteen percent of  
state-court civil cases are appealed. See THOMAS H. COHEN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 212979, APPEALS FROM GENERAL CIVIL TRIALS IN 46 LARGE COUNTIES, 
2001–2005, at 2 (2006), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/agctlc05.pdf [https://perma.cc/5GQP-
76UT]. 
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Google are potentially just a preliminary filter for removal requests, it is 
effectively the definitive authority, or the “courthouse,” that decides on 
the right to be delisted.142 
How is the right to be delisted different from the judicial roles that 
search engines already play online? In many aspects. Practices, like the 
notice-and-takedown of copyright infringement claims, are commenced 
under procedural safeguards such as oversight and transparency. Surely, 
such oversight and transparency are also limited under copyright  
infringement claims, but these elements are ensured to be resolved to a 
greater degree than under the right to be delisted. But mainly, prior to the 
right to be delisted, search engines dealt primarily with various  
applications of private law. They mostly decided on intellectual property 
or torts. But under the right to be delisted, search engines are placed in a 
position of a public court—deciding and balancing between fundamental 
human rights and liberties. While not justifying any judicial  
responsibilities placed on search engines, the latter has more profound 
ramifications to democracy and the rule of law. 
III. THE JUDICIAL DIFFICULTIES IN THE NEW COURTHOUSE 
The rights to be forgotten and delisted have many benefits and 
drawbacks.143 This Article focuses on the impact of the right to be  
delisted on the roles of intermediaries in the digital environment. It  
places search engines in a new role of guardians of human rights and  
liberties without proper transparency and oversight. This new judicial 
role raises both pragmatic and normative difficulties, which should be 
thoroughly scrutinized. Such scrutiny will show that these difficulties 
suggest against the right to be delisted in its current form. It will lead to a 
discussion on how to delineate a more appropriate method of ensuring 
privacy and protection of personal data, while keeping freedom of  
information, freedom of speech, and freedom of the press and without  
undermining the roles of the judicial system under the rule of law. 
                                                     
 142. See Teffer, supra note 139 (arguing that currently, EU citizens generally accept Google as 
the definitive authority in terms of the right to be forgotten [delisted]). 
 143. The benefits and drawbacks of the rights to be forgotten and delisted were scrutinized by 
many scholars and journalists, especially after the ECJ ruling. For examples of such academic  
research, see Ravi Antani, The Resistance of Memory: Could the European Union’s Right to Be  
Forgotten Exist in the United States?, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1173 (2015); Craig A. Newman, ‘A 
Right to Be Forgotten’ Ruling Will Cost Europe, WASH. POST (May 27, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/a-right-to-be-forgotten-will-cost-europe/2014/05/26/ 
93bb0e8c-e131-11e3-9743-bb9b59cde7b9_story.html [https://perma.cc/3A92-7JZF]; Jeffrey Toobin, 
The Solace of Oblivion, NEW YORKER (Sept. 29, 2014), http://www.newyorker.com/ 
magazine/2014/09/29/solace-oblivion [https://perma.cc/C7X3-34Y4]; Ambrose, supra note 14; 
Haber, supra note 28, at 67–76. 
140 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 40:115 
A. The Pragmatic Aspect 
From a pragmatic aspect, the right to be delisted is problematic for 
several reasons.144 Consider the territorial component as an example of 
how the ECJ ruling is not necessarily applicable. Removal requests  
currently extend only to a specific European domain, meaning that 
search results will still be available through other EU domains and,  
obviously, non-EU domains such as “.com.”145 If Europeans know that 
their search results are being manipulated, it will be fairly easy for them 
to bypass such manipulation. Employers—or anyone, for that matter—
may choose to compare the U.S. Google results to the specific EU 
Google results to find out if their workers are trying to hide something 
from them. Not long ago, only basic computer skills were needed to 
make such a comparison: individuals only needed to click on the link that 
says “Use Google.com” in the bottom right-hand corner of the Google 
homepage.146 Such comparison enabled these employers to quickly  
                                                     
 144. Other than reasons listed here, there are many potential reasons why the right to be  
delisted could be considered inapplicable. One example is “the Streisand effect,” named after Barbra 
Streisand, which attempted to suppress photographs of her residence in Malibu inadvertently  
generated further publicity of it. Under such effect, the efforts to suppress online information can 
backfire and end up making things worse for the would-be censor. In the context of the right to be 
forgotten, Mario Costeja González became famous due to the EU ruling. Instead of being forgotten, 
Mr. González is now well known across the globe. However, the fact that Mr. González is now 
famous does not imply that every person that will request erasure will be remembered. The Streisand 
effect will probably not occur with the high magnitude of removal requests. Another example is that 
the right to be delisted could also be abused commercially. See Letter from Peter Fleischer, supra 
note 83, at 6 (“Historically, we have seen [sic] many cases of business competitors trying to abuse 
removals processes to reduce each others’ web presence.”). For more on the Streisand effect, see 
T.C., What is the Streisand Effect?, ECONOMIST (Apr. 15, 2013, 11:50 PM), 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2013/04/economist-explains-what-streisand-
effect [https://perma.cc/R25X-SWS9]. 
 145. The ECJ refrained from addressing the question of whether the right applies outside the 
EU. The Working Party identified the potential problem of the territorial effects of a delisting  
decision, and clearly stated that such behavior would be considered insufficient to comply with the 
Directive requirements. While the Working Party does not possess enforcement power over Google, 
it generally reflects the positions of national regulators in the EU, and thus could quickly become 
obligatory and enforceable for Google and other search engines. See Working Party, supra note 53, 
at 3; Sam Schechner & Frances Robinson, EU Says Google Should Extend ‘Right to Be Forgotten’ 
to ‘.com’ Websites, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 26, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/eu-says-google-
should-extend-right-to-be-forgotten-to-com-websites-1417006254; Liam Tung, Bing and Yahoo 
Respond to ‘Right to Be Forgotten’ Requests, ZDNET (Dec. 1, 2014) http://www.zdnet.com/ 
article/bing-and-yahoo-respond-to-right-to-be-forgotten-requests. 
 146. Currently, almost every non-EU search domain will not be part of the right to be delisted. 
Peter Fleischer, Google’s Global privacy counsel, states, “We do not read the decision by the Court 
of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”) in the case C-131/12 (the “Decision”) as global in 
reach—it was an application of European law that applies to services offered to Europeans.” See 
Letter from Peter Fleischer, supra note 83, at 3. But such practice might change in light of  
regulation. Beyond the Working Party’s recommendations on this matter, local data protection  
agencies have begun to instruct that the right to be forgotten must be applied across all versions of 
the search engine. The French data protection authority (CNIL) recently decided in such manner 
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discover the more hidden search results, as they will be missing from the 
specific EU Google domain.147 
But as regulators quickly acknowledged, such problem could be  
resolved easily. Regulators could oblige search engines that operate in 
the EU, or perhaps even process data of EU citizens, to comply with the 
right to be delisted for all domains, meaning that the delisting will occur 
on all of their services; restrict access to such sites;148 or use geolocation 
technology to restrict access to information for EU citizens.149 While 
matters of jurisdiction and borders are highly controversial in the digital 
environment,150 few courts have already obliged Google to remove  
results from all Google domains.151 Recent reports suggest that search 
results removals are now applied to domains (including Google.com) 
beyond Europe, if the browser is located within the European Union.152 
                                                                                                                       
against Google, and Google’s informal appeal on this decision to the CNIL was rejected. Google’s 
case will most likely be decided by the French Supreme Court. See Mason Hayes & Curran, Right to 
Be Forgotten Going Global – French Regulator Orders Takedown on .coms, SILICON REPUBLIC 
(Nov. 2, 2015), https://www.siliconrepublic.com/enterprise/2015/11/02/right-to-be-forgotten-cnil-
france-eu; Samuel Gibbs, French Data Regulator Rejects Google’s Right-to-Be-Forgotten Appeal, 
GUARDIAN (Sept. 21, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/sep/21/french-google-
right-to-be-forgotten-appeal [https://perma.cc/47GA-B3XL]; Working Party, supra note 53, at 9. 
 147. Jonathan Zittrain, Don’t Force Google to ‘Forget’, N.Y. TIMES (May 14, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/15/opinion/dont-force-google-to-forget.html?_r=0 (“Even in  
Europe, search engine users will no doubt cultivate the same Internet “workarounds” that Chinese 
citizens use to see what their government doesn’t want them to see.”). 
 148. In this context, restriction means that EU member states will pass regulation which will 
place civil, administrative or criminal liability on their citizens and/or third-parties for using search 
engines outside of the EU. 
 149. Horatia Muir Watt, Yahoo! Cyber Collision of Cultures: Who Regulates?, 24 MICH. J. 
INT’L L. 673, 683 (2003) (“[G]eographical indeterminacy on the Internet is not inevitable, but results 
from ideological choice.”); Steven C. Bennett, The “Right to Be Forgotten”: Reconciling EU and 
US Perspectives, 30 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 161, 190 (2012). However, even the use of such  
technologies could by bypassed by users. See, e.g., Justice S. Muralidhar, Jurisdictional Issues in 
Cyberspace, 6 INDIAN J.L. & TECH. 1, 3 (2010) (“Even while it was thought that one could fix the 
physical location of the computer from where the transaction originates and the one where it ends, 
that too can be bypassed or ‘masked.’”). 
 150. For a general discussion on jurisdiction and territoriality in the Internet, see David R. 
Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders—The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L REV. 1367 
(1996); Henry H. Perrit, Jr., Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, 41 VILL. L. REV. 1 (1996); Joel R. 
Reidenberg, States and Internet Enforcement, 1 U. OTTAWA L. & TECH. J. 213 (2004). 
 151. See Equustek Solutions Inc. v. Jack, 2014 BCSC 1063 (Can.) for an example in Canada 
where the Supreme Court of British Columbia ordered Google to delete links to various websites. In 
terms of the right to be delisted, a French court fined Google for delisting results on its French  
subsidiary but not globally. See Lisa Vaas, Google Fined for Not Taking Down “Right to Be Forgot-
ten” Links Worldwide, NAKEDSECURITY (Nov. 19, 2014), https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/ 
2014/11/19/google-fined-for-not-taking-down-right-to-be-forgotten-links-worldwide 
[https://perma.cc/YMG6-UWVS]. 
 152. See Samuel Gibbs, Google to Extend ‘Right to be Forgotten’ to All Its Domains Accessed 
in EU, GUARDIAN (Feb. 11, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/feb/11/google-
extend-right-to-be-forgotten-googlecom [https://perma.cc/QZB6-MZYD]. 
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But requiring such geolocation technologies would place a high burden 
on search engines, would raise privacy concerns, could stifle innovation, 
and could be generally dangerous for democratic societies.153 Thus,  
unless EU citizens will be legally and/or technologically restricted from 
using search engines that operate outside the EU, the ability of the right 
to be delisted to achieve its purposes is unlikely.154 But beyond technical 
problems, the right to be delisted raises pragmatic problems arising from 
Google’s relatively unusual new role as a courthouse. 
1. Decision-Making and Asymmetrical Information 
Decision-making under the right to be delisted currently  
necessitates a nonautomated procedure. Unlike copyright infringement 
claims under a notice-and-takedown regime,155 the right to be delisted is 
based upon human intervention, at least for now. Examiners are tasked 
with deciding which search results are inadequate, irrelevant, no longer 
relevant, or excessive. In order to evaluate whether to delist the data  
subject from search results, search engines’ operators provide guidelines 
for their examiners to follow. However, as this Article further argues, 
such guidelines are technically almost impossible to meet, especially 
when search engines are the deciders, and this could lead to suboptimal 
results. 
The four components of the right to be delisted are vague. Deciding 
whether content is inadequate, irrelevant, no longer relevant, or excessive 
requires a more substantive record and more evidence than a few notes 
written in an online form. It necessitates context. The decider needs to 
obtain background information on the data subject and the consequences 
surrounding the request. It may also require depositions, testimonies, and 
other types of evidence, which cannot be provided under the current 
practice. There may also be another side to the story, which search  
engines will not be aware of. It would be highly difficult, if not  
impossible, to evaluate such requests, when the only information  
examined is provided by the requester, and the evaluators rely only on 
                                                     
 153. For an overview of such potential normative and pragmatic difficulties, see Bennett, supra 
note 149, at 191–92. 
 154. It should be noted that currently more than 95% of all search queries in Google  
originating in Europe are on local versions, not Google.com. However, such practice may change in 
light of the right to be delisted and/or forgotten. See LUCIANO FLORIDI, ET. AL, REPORT OF THE 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO GOOGLE ON THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN 19 (2015), 
https://buermeyer.de/wp/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/Report-of-the-Advisory-Committee-to-
Google-on-the-Right-to-be-Forgotten.pdf [https://perma.cc/5PV2-2PCU] (providing statistical use of 
Google in Europe). 
 155. See supra note 88. 
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what the requester claims to be accurate.156 This is mainly due to the ex 
parte nature of the process and its secrecy. The process eventually leads 
to information gaps caused by imperfect or asymmetrical information,157 
which could be partially resolved under a judicial proceeding. Only 
through the crucible of an adversarial proceeding can a decision-maker 
fully comprehend the consequences of his or her judgments. 
But the main problem is the decision process itself. One concern  
relates to the nature of the four components of the right to be delisted. 
Currently, the vagueness of how search engines should operate under the 
ECJ ruling presents a major challenge. Search engines require more  
detailed guidelines on how to interpret the ECJ ruling, which could aid 
them in deciding what is “inadequate, irrelevant, no longer relevant, or 
excessive.”158 Until then, the decision-making procedure will be either 
performed according to the search engine’s own internal guidelines, or 
even worse, be merely arbitrary. That makes Google not only a judge, 
but also a regulator, as it creates the rules for the right to be delisted. 
Another concern is the expertise of examiners. Examiners are 
Google employees. They are not necessarily equipped with proper  
expertise to evaluate complex requests. They are not likely to be retired 
judges or to have ever held any judicial position in their life. Many of 
them, though not all, are probably not experts in the field of EU privacy 
or information laws, either.159 They are not necessarily even familiar with 
EU domestic law or the culture of the requester, which could be relevant 
to the examination. Aside from the normative problems such concerns 
raise, it might prove difficult for such examiners to make decisions. It is 
not merely an information gap problem, but rather one of necessary  
expertise to make difficult evaluations. Over time, such examiners could 
acquire expertise. Currently, the nontransparent nature of the removal 
process and the relatively short time the process has existed does not  
enable an evaluation of whether examiners are capable of acquiring  
                                                     
 156. Peter Fleischer states, 
We generally have to rely on the requester for information, without assurance beyond the 
requester’s own assertions as to its accuracy. Some requests turn out to have been made 
with false and inaccurate information. Even if requesters provide us with accurate  
information, they understandably may avoid presenting facts that are not in their favour. 
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preserving the accessibility of a search result. 
Letter from Peter Fleischer, supra note 83, at 12 (emphasis added). 
 157. R. George Wright, The Right to Be Forgotten: Issuing a Voluntary Recall, 7 DREXEL L. 
REV. 401, 414 (2015). 
 158. While the Working Party provided some guidelines, they were highly limited and did not 
address all components. See Working Party, supra note 53, at 11–20. 
 159. See Lee, supra note 10, at 44 (suggesting that employees at the national DPAs may  
possess greater knowledge of EU privacy law than Google’s employees). 
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expertise. Moreover, acquiring such expertise could take time.  
Meanwhile, Google’s examiners could be making uneducated decisions. 
2. Costs and High Barriers of Market Entry 
Exercising the right to be delisted is expensive. The removal  
process requires a decision by many human beings160 and, therefore,  
demands allocating financial resources.161 Another potential cost of  
implementation of the right to be delisted will arise if search engines  
become obliged to use geolocation technology to restrict access to  
information for EU citizens.162 Such financial aspects raise pragmatic 
concerns as the magnitude of removal requests is relatively high and 
should not be taken lightly. In June 2016, two years after Google  
initiated their removal process, it received 443,501 requests containing 
1,553,218 URLs that it had to evaluate for removal.163 Roughly, this 
amounts to 2,065 URLs per day, every day.164 Relying on such statistics, 
it is financially difficult for any search engine to fully comply with the 
right to be delisted. 
Shortly after the ECJ ruling, even Google officials warned that the 
removal process might be beyond their financial capabilities.165 It is not. 
While the quality of Google’s decisions may be questionable,166 in terms 
of managing the quantity of requests, it has done a rather good job thus 
far. Nevertheless, while Google currently possesses sufficient financial 
resources to comply with the EU decision, less wealthy search engines 
                                                     
 160. Peter Fleischer, Google’s Global privacy counsel, stated, “We have many people working 
full time on the process, and ensuring enough resources are available for the processing of requests 
required a significant hiring effort.” Letter from Peter Fleischer, supra note 83, at 10. 
 161. The creation of the removal process itself should not be expensive. Creating an online 
“removal” form for EU members is the easy part for search engines. It is relatively not costly, and 
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entry. 
 162. For further discussion of the ramifications of geographical borders online, see generally 
Johnson & Post, supra note 149. 
 163. See European Privacy Requests for Search Removals, supra note 135. 
 164. Google officially launched their removal process in May 29, 2014, which means that 752 
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after Google launched their services, they reported a rate of 10,000 removal requests per day. See id. 
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Repeat in U.S., NBC NEWS (May 26, 2014), http://www.nbcnews.com/tech/internet/google-right-be-
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 166. I further discuss the potential normative difficulties which arise from Google’s process, 
which is difficult to assess due to lack of full transparency in Part III.B. 
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might not.167 Thus, the high costs of compliance create another problem: 
they pose high barriers to market entry, and encourage an oligopoly  
market. In that sense, Google might actually benefit from the right to be 
delisted, as it could reduce competition and eliminate new search  
engines. New search engines will have much difficulty with complying 
with the ECJ ruling. Society loses in such a scenario, as innovation could 
take a huge hit.168 Perhaps the ECJ decision leaves some room for  
interpretation regarding non-wealthy search engines, incapable of dealing 
with such process.169 However, such a statement by the ECJ is subject to 
interpretation and does not necessarily exempt search engines lacking 
financial resources. 
B. The Normative Aspect 
Normatively, the right to be delisted raises many concerns due to 
the fact that search engines are now making decisions for which they are 
unequipped and for which they should not be tasked.170 The judicial  
system, not search engines, is tasked with upholding the rule of law and 
settling disputes. Under the ECJ ruling, search engines effectively  
became one of the three branches of government.171 They should now be 
treated as a much more formal part of the judicial system, making  
judicial decisions on fundamental rights and liberties. This judicial role 
raises many normative concerns. 
1. The Problems of Judiciary Privatization 
The state encodes rights into laws and uses threats and acts of  
coercion to enforce them.172 Should some roles of the state be  
                                                     
 167. Catherine Baksi, Right to Be Forgotten “Must Go,” Lords Committee Says, L. GAZETTE 
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 172. Clifford J. Rosky, Force, Inc.: The Privatization of Punishment, Policing, and Military 
Force in Liberal States, 36 CONN. L. REV. 879, 885 (2004). 
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monopolistic?173 And more specifically—should the judiciary?174 In  
practice, these roles are not necessarily as monopolistic as we might  
assume. Privatization, the shifting of government functions to the private 
sector,175 often occurs under all three branches of the government.176 
We can witness some forms of privatization of the executive branch 
mainly in terms of enforcement. Many states have privatized policing.177 
As part of this enforcement privatization, some states also have partially 
privatized parts of their penal systems.178 Even militaries are partially 
privatized.179 The legislative branch is also privatized to some extent. 
                                                     
 173. Id. at 886–91 (suggesting the “monopoly thesis” regarding the use of force in society). 
 174. There are various justifications for the sole authority of the state to act as a judiciary. 
Thomas Hobbes argued under the social contract, sovereign must control civil, military, judicial, 
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Stephin Rushin, The Regulation of Private Police, 115 W. VA. L. REV. 159 (2012); David A.  
Sklansky, The Private Police, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1165 (1998); Rosky, supra note 172. 
 178. Under such privatization in the United States, by the early 1980s the government recruited 
private corporations to provide prison services. See Douglas C. McDonald, Public Imprisonment by 
Private Means: The Reemergence of Private Prisons and Jails in the United States, the United  
Kingdom and Australia, 34 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 29, 29–32 (1994); Rosky, supra note 172, at 902. 
 179. By privatization of the military, I mostly refer to the emergence of private military  
companies (PMCs) which offer training of troops, logistical support and specialization, military 
equipment and supplies, intelligence systems, materiel procurement, static-site defense, and  
peacekeeping. However, there are even some examples of privatization of actual combat. Two such 
examples are “Executive Outcomes” and “Sandline International,” two companies which engaged in 
direct military conflict for clients, mostly in Africa. In addition, there are numerous PMCs which 
were actively engaging in combat in Bosnia, Columbia, and around the world. See generally P.W. 
Singer, CORPORATE WARRIORS: THE RISE OF THE PRIVATIZED MILITARY INDUSTRY (2003);  
Jonathan Weisman & Anitha Reddy, Spending on Iraq Sets Off Gold Rush, WASH. POST (Oct. 9, 
2003), at A1 (discussing the services provided by private military companies in Iraq); Sam Kiley, 
Send in the Mercenaries, Mr. Cook, TIMES (London), Jan. 22, 1999, LEXIS, News Library, Times 
File; Rosky, supra note 172, at 904–12. 
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Regulation in many instances involves private actors.180 Aside from  
private contributions to regulation, legislators often ask Standard Setting 
Organizations (SSOs) to produce standards that turn into legislation,181 
and sometimes delegate power to self-regulatory bodies.182 The judiciary 
is no exception to such privatization in modern society.183 Adjudication 
many times shifts to private systems of justice like those utilizing  
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) procedures. In California, the  
judiciary was partially privatized through a procedure commonly referred 
to as “rent-a-judge.”184 Many private parties also conduct some form of 
adjudication.185 The ECJ ruling expands such judiciary privatization, and 
as this Article further suggests, the judicial role under the right to be del-
isted has different characteristics. 
There are several arguments as to why Google should act as a  
judiciary under the right to be delisted. They begin with a pragmatic  
argument of economic efficiency. If Google serves as a more efficient 
judicial system than courts and DPAs in EU Member States, then from 
an economic perspective, it should be placed in such position. Generally, 
it could be more economically efficient to place the burden of removing 
links to content on search engines and/or other intermediaries than on 
courts. Courts are usually overloaded with cases as it is,186 and the  
magnitude of removal requests could have possibly led to a highly slow 
mechanism, that is, if courts could even cope with such a magnitude of 
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 182. Freeman, supra note 180, at 551. 
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internal policies and/or contractual obligation, and the results of the dispute will only apply to rights 
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 186. See ABA ACTION COMM’N TO REDUCE COURT COSTS AND DELAY, ATTACKING 
LITIGATION COSTS AND DELAY 1 (1984). 
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requests in the first place. On the other hand, many search engines  
employ large numbers of workers and usually have vast financial  
resources that could be allocated to deal with such a high magnitude of 
removal requests.187 
Search engines are most likely in the best position to prevent  
misconduct at a reasonably low cost.188 It is easier and cheaper to sue 
Google than every website, especially since website operators could be 
located abroad.189 In addition, aside from the problem of asymmetric  
information,190 search engines are economically in the best position to 
delist; after all, search engines are the very entities that manage the lists. 
As shown from the pragmatic aspect of the right to be delisted, Google 
services are efficient, as they provide judgments quickly. The supply of 
courts or DPAs might not satisfy the magnitude of removal requests, i.e., 
the demand. Search engines are likely more efficient than the current 
overloaded judicial system, which relies on limited public financial  
resources. The mechanism used by Google reduces transaction costs for 
the parties involved in the dispute, which would be higher if courts were 
involved.191 In addition, making search engines decision-makers could 
reduce chances of conflicting decisions, if say, DPAs or courts in the 
twenty-eight EU Member States were making such decisions.192 In other 
words, placing liability on search engines eliminates courts from serving 
as a middleman, and directly links the data subject with the controller of 
the information (or the controller of the link to the information). Thus, 
                                                     
 187. Naturally, variance depends on the search engine in question and the magnitude of the 
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 192. See Lee, supra note 10, at 50. 
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from an economic perspective, placing liability on search engines could 
be justified.193 
But the Google courthouse raises a few normative concerns that 
could surpass economic considerations. First, the judicial role of Google 
could potentially erode traditional judicial authority. Courts settle  
disputes; that is their primary purpose.194 Beyond dispute settling, courts, 
at least in common law jurisdictions, have another important function: 
they engage in rulemaking.195 They play an important role in society to 
“explicate and give force to the values embodied in authoritative 
texts . . . to interpret those values and to bring reality into accord with 
them.”196 Public courts speak for society and their decisions carry social 
weight, far greater than the decisions of private courts.197 Thus, making 
search engines courthouses—separate from other search engines who 
also act as courthouses—could risk the development of the law.198 
Moreover, practical difficulties should not always prevail over a 
normative argument, especially where public interests and values are at 
stake.199 Even economists would most likely agree that economic  
efficiency should not transfer the role of the state in judicial services.200 
Thus, the economic argument does not prevail here. While privatization 
of the judiciary could be justified in some cases, it cannot be for the right 
to be delisted, as public laws or public values are involved. Such cases 
must be reserved for a public judiciary, not Google.201 
Another concern of privatization is public accountability.  
Privatizing adjudication of the right to be delisted diminishes the public 
accountability of the judicial system. The public accountability argument 
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is divided into two groups turning on the distinction between public and 
private institutional purposes and the distinction between public and  
private accountability mechanisms.202 The first concern relates to the  
different purposes of the judicial system and Google. Google pursues 
economic gains more than political and legal goals.203 The second  
concern rests on the assumption that the judicial system and Google rely 
upon different accountability mechanisms. While the judicial system  
relies on electoral accountability, Google relies on market  
accountability.204 
The accountability arguments against privatization mostly rely on 
the nature of search engines. They are for-profit, commercial entities that 
were not chosen by the public to uphold a judiciary position. The  
individuals who make the decisions are not public officials, and their 
identity is hidden from the public. As the process is highly opaque and 
lacks proper oversight (such attributes will be further discussed in the 
next part), and as very few individuals currently appeal Google’s  
decisions,205 search engines will not be held accountable for most of their 
decisions. Overall, Google lacks public accountability for its decisions.206 
The final concern is one of appellate remedies and is more of a  
general criticism of the right to be delisted. In most states, litigants are 
guaranteed at least one appeal as of right.207 Such an appellate remedy is 
generally granted to protect against arbitrary or erroneous application of 
the law, to promote the development and standardization of legal  
doctrine, and to assist in standardizing outcomes for similarly situated 
litigants.208 Such protections are not granted under the right to be  
delisted, as the appeal procedure is flawed. The European data subject is 
entitled to request that a local DPA review the decision and may even 
file a lawsuit against Google based upon its rejection.209 But Google does 
not provide enough data on the rejection of claims to the claimant.210 
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Moreover, while webmasters currently may request Google to reconsider 
a decision,211 other impacted parties—most importantly, members of  
society—do not receive such right as they are unaware of any  
proceedings, and the option of a counter-notice does not constitute an 
appeal. Leaving the judicial role with the courts could enable at least 
third parties to participate in the controversy. Moreover, even if the right 
to be delisted will be adjudicated by courts without a de facto right to 
appeal, the decision will still be made by a judicial entity that is subject 
to some oversight, is generally more equipped to make educated  
decisions, and is more accountable for its decisions. 
2. Transparency and Oversight 
Transparency plays a crucial role in judicial processes. The process 
for exercising the right to be delisted is almost entirely opaque. Legally, 
there is currently no requirement under EU data protection laws to  
provide any sort of information on the process or the removed links. On 
the contrary, search engines are most likely forbidden from handing out 
information on removal requests.212 Search engines like Google do  
publish transparency reports and provide some insights into their  
process.213 Under its transparency report, Google provides a general  
numerical count of the total URLs that it evaluated for removal, the total 
requests that it received, the percentages of removals and rejections, a 
few examples of requests it received from individuals, and finally a site 
listing of the “most impacted websites” from such requests.214 But such 
information is highly limited and should not constitute sufficient  
transparency. Contrast this reporting, for example, with the copyright 
notice-and-takedown regime, in which online service providers usually 
notify users that search results had been removed, and third parties, like 
Lumen, publish removal requests.215 
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The fact that some search engines publish transparency reports and 
provide insights to their process is important. While still limited, the  
current form of transparency Google provides is crucial for oversight and 
protection of fundamental rights. Knowing that Google does not reject 
nor accept all removal requests indicates that probably some form of  
decision-making occurs under its procedure. But this is far from enough. 
We need access to information on the nature of requests, such as what 
information typically gets delisted and what does not. While Google  
provides some examples of the requests and its decisions, such  
hand-picked, anecdotal evidence should not be treated as representative 
of the process. 
Transparency is highly crucial for preserving fundamental rights. 
Beyond the fact that many search engines are publicly traded  
companies,216 and thereby many of their actions must be observable by 
outsiders, the importance of transparency dramatically rises when these 
search engines act as courthouses. Lack of transparency arguably better 
protects the right to be delisted and will probably also exist in a  
traditional judiciary.217 But this argument should not turn search engines 
into judges. If adjudication by search engines under the right to be  
delisted cannot be transparent, then we should not let search engines  
replace the judiciary—that is, unless we place search engines merely as a 
preliminary process before the judiciary. Not all courts are fully  
transparent. Some court hearings are behind closed doors, and some 
courts are even considered “secret courts.”218 Even if the judicial role 
under the right to be delisted will be placed on courts, they will most 
likely be opaque. The difference, however, is mainly the impartiality and 
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107. 
 216. For a list of publicly-traded companies which include Google (now a subsidiary of  
Alphabet Inc.) and Microsoft (which operates Bing), see The World’s Biggest Public Companies, 
FORBES, http://www.forbes.com/global2000/list/#tab:overall (last visited Jan. 17, 2016). 
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individuals could analyze the outcomes of such requests and learn how to manipulate the systems. 
However, this would hardly be different from the judicial process, in which individuals, and perhaps 
mostly lawyers, could try to learn patterns in the application of the law by courts. 
 218. Such example is the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) in the United States, a 
“secret court” that examine classified information relating to national security. See Peter Margulies, 
The NSA in Global Perspective: Surveillance, Human Rights, and International Counterterrorism, 
82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2137, 2139 (2014). 
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public accountability of such courts, which requires them to act under the 
rule of law. 
The second normative concern comes from the lack of proper  
oversight. Someone must judge the judges. Without such oversight, 
search engines could misuse or even abuse their authority without  
repercussions. Oversight, in this matter, does not impede the right to be 
delisted. Prima facie, oversight exists under the right to be delisted, as 
data subjects can appeal to a DPA or a court on search engines’  
decisions. But as previously noted, this appeal process is flawed because 
it appears that most individuals effectively do not appeal, and it does not 
grant oversight on the accepted requests because there is no one to make 
an appeal. Even if oversight is problematic under the right to be delisted, 
much like in the concern of transparency, leaving adjudication in the 
courts could be important due to their impartiality and the public  
accountability of such courts to act under the rule of law. 
3. Procedural Safeguards 
One of the major difficulties of the right to be delisted is the  
negative impact on procedural safeguards.219 Procedural safeguards could 
highly vary between states and legal systems, and Google’s role as a  
judiciary under the right to be delisted should be scrutinized by each EU 
Member State or any other state that legislates such right.220 The goal of 
this part is more normative than pragmatic: to examine general  
characterizations of procedural safeguards, commonly referred to in 
many countries as due process. Due process is usually divided into two 
separate categories: procedural due process and substantive due  
process.221 What is most relevant here is procedural due process, which 
conventionally means that deprivations of life, liberty, and property must 
accord with lawful process.222 It is generally comprised of sufficient  
notice, a right to an impartial arbiter, and a right to give testimony and 
admit evidence. 
The first part of due process, sufficient notice, will present a  
problem that arises more from the right to be delisted itself than from the 
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role of search engines in the process. Some notice exists under the  
removal process. Google notifies the data subject and, in some instances, 
the webmaster of the URL that is requested for removal regarding the 
removal request and Google’s decision.223 While it seems that Article 
7(c) and 7(f) of the DPD permit this disclosure,224 under the instructions 
of the Working Party, such notification to webmasters might not be legal 
as a general practice,225 but rather only in cases where the search engine 
needs to obtain additional information for the assessment of the  
circumstances surrounding that request.226 However, there is another  
party to the controversy that does not get any form of notice but is  
deprived of liberty: other members of society. 
The second potential procedural safeguard that specifically relates 
to search engines is the right to an impartial arbiter. Judges should be 
impartial.227 Their decisions are unbiased, at least to some extent.228 The 
judicial system as a whole, when it works properly, is generally  
impartial. However, when granting a judicial role to a for-profit,  
commercial entity, bias is almost inevitable.229 Google, Yahoo!, and 
Bing, among other search engines, possess commercial and business  
incentives and policies. Their primary goal is to increase the wealth of 
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to be forgotten). 
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their shareholders.230 Such policies create a bias that is troubling when 
they are acting as judiciaries. Such bias could move Google to act over or 
underinclusively, depending on the specific reason behind its bias.  
Biases will generally result from competition and incentives. 
Search engines compete with each other. When displaying search 
results, they often favor their own services if they exist.231 They may also 
favor their own advertisers and affiliated corporate providers when 
providing search results.232 They also compete on traffic with other  
websites that provide services. Some of these companies, like Google, 
are more than simply search engines. Indeed, they are a subsidiary of a 
parent company (Alphabet Inc.) that owns and operates various types of 
services, like social media platforms. Therefore, they are competing with 
other operators. Search engines might abuse their power to reduce traffic 
to competing services and websites. As the transparency of requests is 
highly limited, especially when they are approved, the lack of oversight 
would permit such practice without fear of antitrust violation or any  
other form of liability. 
Then we have incentives. Search engines have two opposing  
incentives. On the one hand, their business models rely on information 
and access to this information. Removing links from their search results 
is against their incentive to provide accurate information and as much of 
it as possible. When they are not providing a search result that exists on 
the web, they are not performing the task that is at the heart of their  
business model. On the other hand, risking liability could be costly. To 
that end, search engines might choose to act overinclusively rather than 
underinclusively when making decisions.233 Such overinclusiveness 
clearly leads to endangering freedom of information and speech, but it 
also leads to a biased mechanism by which search engines make  
decisions—that is, based on incentives and not on facts. Judicial systems 
should not be motivated by such considerations. 
Finally, due process necessitates a right to give testimony and admit 
evidence. As decisions are conducted behind closed doors, in an ex parte 
procedure,234 the claimant is the only one able to make requests to 
Google, and even he is not entitled to give oral testimony.235 Other  
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parties interested in the controversy have neither a right to give  
testimony nor a right to admit evidence. If the role of the judiciary will 
be placed on courts, then the claimant will have the opportunity to give 
oral testimony, and perhaps even the publisher will have a chance to  
dispute the claim. 
4. Protecting Fundamental Rights 
The right to be delisted might have a negative impact on  
fundamental rights. The first set of rights are freedom of speech, freedom 
of information, and freedom of the press.236 The second set of rights are 
rights to privacy,237 and an individual’s right to protect personal data 
concerning himself or herself.238 But here the argument goes beyond the 
traditional criticism of the possible negative impact of the right to be  
delisted on fundamental rights. Rather, the judicial role of search engines 
raises an even greater threat to the protection of such rights. 
I begin with the former set of rights. The right to be delisted could 
be viewed as a form of Internet censorship,239 as it potentially threatens 
speech,240 access to information, and the freedom of the press.241 Prima 
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2016] Privatization of the Judiciary 157 
facie, freedom of information does not suffer a huge impact.242 No  
information is deleted from the original source. Unlike the right to be 
forgotten, the right to be delisted only affects search engines’ queries 
linked to a specific name where the link is to information that is  
irrelevant, outdated, or otherwise inappropriate. The right only affects the 
results obtained from searches of a person’s name and does not require 
deletion of the link from the indexes of the search engine altogether. The 
information is not removed from the Internet, only from a specific EU 
domain. 
However, search engines still play a crucial role in protecting such 
fundamental rights. When Google stops linking to a website, it is highly 
likely that fewer people will be able to locate it. Without links from 
search engines, the Internet will remain a collection of data sets so large 
and complex, they will be nearly impossible to use. Thus, the ECJ ruling 
could have a huge impact on freedom of speech, freedom of information, 
and freedom of the press. It also derogates the role of counter speech and 
could disrupt the process of communication.243 
The second set of rights relates to privacy and data protection.  
Under the EU perception of privacy and data protection, the processing 
carried out by search engines is liable to significantly affect the  
fundamental rights to privacy244 and the protection of personal data.  
Furthermore, the protection of these rights is crucial under the EU  
regime. But beyond merely being important, such right to be delisted was 
characterized in the EU as a fundamental or human right.245 Under the 
right to be delisted, search engines, mainly Google, are the almost-sole 
enforcer and judge. 
Privatization of the judiciary raises concerns for the protection of 
both sets of rights.246 Google will not protect human rights to the extent 
that the traditional justice system will. Google might intentionally decide 
on requests to cut costs or to better serve its business model. While  
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current practice could suggest otherwise,247 search engines could, at 
some point, be more likely to comply with many requests to remove  
content to avoid litigation and partially to reduce costs, thereby removing 
legitimate content and negatively impacting freedom of information.248 
They might also cut back on labor and find methods to reduce costs. 
They might find ways to improve the speed of the process. But such 
practices could erode the protection of human rights. 
5. Empowering the Powerful 
It would seem that search engines were given a role that is not in 
their best interests.249 While the right to be delisted clearly imposes a  
financial burden on search engines, they could also benefit from their 
judicial role due to information they receive in the process of  
examination. Google already maintains vast amounts of power. It stores 
vast amounts of information on individuals around the globe. But placing 
Google in a judicial role enhances such power in a few ways. First, with 
judicial powers, Google could shape norms. This argument might be a bit 
naïve, in the sense that Google already possesses such ability, and 
Google does not require a right to be delisted to shape how  
individuals view information on the web. Mostly, it enhances its  
information-gathering capabilities. While Google already possesses 
enormous information-gathering capabilities, this argument is not naïve. 
Under the removal process, Google asks for documentation of the  
identity of the claimant, which it collects and stores.250 Beyond storing 
information, it will now possess copies of personal documents, such as 
driver’s licenses or national ID cards, from individuals in the EU.251  
Furthermore, when Google investigates the facts asserted in removal  
requests, it is able to gather more information on its users than is  
currently available online. It could acquire better contextual knowledge 
on the personal details of individuals’ lives. 
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Such power could be highly problematic. While everyone else is 
forgetting, search engines now have more to remember. The main  
concern is not that search engines will be made even more  
knowledgeable, but rather that third parties could obtain such  
information. As data mining is at the heart of search engines’ business 
models,252 such information could be either traded to other companies or 
even to governments. As we learned from Edward Snowden’s  
revelations, the National Security Agency (NSA) gathered electronic 
communications, including metadata and content, through public–private 
partnerships with companies like Google, among others.253 Hence,  
beyond commercial actions such as targeted advertising, search engines 
might share information on EU citizens and residents with the U.S.  
government or other governments. 
IV. THE FUTURE OF THE PRIVATE JUDICIARY 
It is difficult to prophesize which trajectory the right to be forgotten 
will take. While the future of the right to be forgotten is uncertain, the 
right to be delisted is already implemented, even beyond the EU.254 The 
EU placed search engines in a judicial role to solve some of the problems 
that arose from the e-memory revolution. Even if one accepts the notion 
that search engines should be placed in such positions—and this Article 
does not—it would be wise to first generally scrutinize whether a legal 
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solution is needed. Under one hypothesis, if there are other, less  
restrictive measures that could be deployed to protect fundamental rights, 
then we should consider them first. If such less restrictive measures exist, 
then the debate on who should be tasked with acting as the judiciary 
could be pragmatically irrelevant. 
A. Regulating Behavior 
The EU chose to revive data protection under the DPD, and thereby 
protect EU citizens and residents online. It is even attempting to 
strengthen such protection using the GDPR to create a right to be  
forgotten. In other words, the EU chose the law as a modality to regulate 
behavior. But the law is not the only modality for regulating behavior. 
Lawrence Lessig suggested three modalities (or constraints), other than 
law, for regulating behavior: architectural design (code), market, and 
social norms.255 Any such modality, with or without the law, could  
potentially aid in achieving a right to be delisted. 
The first modality (code, or stated more simply, technology) could 
aid in solving some of these issues. We can use privacy-by-design (PbD) 
to change the default rules for storing information altogether.256 Systems 
could allow users to better control their information online by creating 
“deletion” buttons. On that ground we could also set expiration dates and 
place various restrictions on the use of information.257 We can  
technologically (and legally) grant civilians a “reputation bankruptcy” 
ability to de-emphasize or entirely delete online information about them 
from time to time.258 Yet this approach will mostly solve problems  
relating to the data subject’s own data, not third parties, and therefore 
would be insufficient.259 Furthermore, such a self-censoring mechanism 
is highly problematic in terms of the flow of information online. Can we 
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really know how long information will be valuable for us or for society 
when we set an expiration date? 
Another technological solution could arise from  
contextualization.260 Under such an approach, data subjects will be  
granted the ability to correct online information that is inaccurate, false, 
incomplete, out-of-date, or otherwise inappropriate, by providing details 
explaining the data.261 Such mechanism, to a great extent, is normatively 
opposite to the conception of censorship; instead of delisting results, and 
thereby deleting links to content to preserve privacy, search engines and 
other websites will contain more information.262 But such a  
proposal would not qualify as a proper solution for privacy as viewed in 
the EU. To a great extent, it would depend on resources. An individual 
with high financial and human resources could manipulate information 
online by posting more than the mere individual who does not possess 
similar capabilities. Moreover, placing comments near a link to an article 
will not necessarily help repair reputation, especially when the reader is 
aware of the obvious impartiality of the commentator. And even so, such 
mechanism could be abused by third parties who wish to further harm the 
data subject either because of some personal connection or because they 
are simply Internet trolls.263 
The second modality is that of the market. The market’s role in  
securing civil rights and liberties could be significant. Consumer  
expectations could potentially create negotiable grounds for the usage 
and retention of data.264 But more realistically,265 if the law was chosen 
to regulate behavior, then the market can raise transparency of both the 
removal process and the requests made. Individuals could choose search 
engines that provide more transparency than their competitors. Such 
transparency could also come from third parties. Third parties could offer 
a one-stop shop for filing removal requests with search engines, and such 
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services have indeed begun to emerge.266 These companies could then 
publish statistics and information on the outcomes of their requests 
(while, probably, removing personally identifiable information (PII)).267 
Thus, while search engines might refrain from publishing decisions,  
either because of a legal restriction or partially because they fear that 
individuals will accumulate knowledge on how to “beat the system,”  
external removal services could emerge.268 Nevertheless, transparency of 
search engines does not only rely on economic incentives, which could 
be effected by the behavior of their consumers, but rather also on  
regulation. Generally, if a regulator decides to restrict such transparency, 
either by search engines or third parties that provide such transparency 
services, then market powers may be too limited to regulate behavior. 
But instead of treating the symptoms of the application of the right 
to be delisted, like lack of transparency, the market can find other  
solutions to solve the problem of the (almost) never-forgetting Internet 
without turning to the right to be delisted. One service could be offered 
directly by search engines to either remove links upon request and/or 
make them practically invisible in a search query. It could be driven by 
economic incentives—i.e., that search engines like Google offer removal 
of links for a fee—or driven by market forces. For example, if consumers 
will only use search engines that offer such removal services for free, the 
market will eventually force search engines to comply. The first scenario 
is perhaps more plausible than the second, but they both appear fictional. 
For such a move by the market, there would have to be a consensus as to 
what constitutes online censorship. But these potential mechanisms 
would be highly controversial, as they would allow for the censorship of 
large swaths of information. From a legal perspective, such  
self-censorship could be problematic, as search engines might fear  
antitrust and unfair competition laws, which could mandate full  
disclosure of the removal process. Mainly, it requires search engines to 
act against their business models, which rely on information. 
But a market solution could also come from third parties. Even  
today, individuals can deploy several self-aid mechanisms to reduce  
accessibility to harmful online content. One way, combined with the  
modality of code, is to manipulate search results, so that the harmful  
results will appear much lower in the search engine’s results. No  
technological expertise is needed here, as there are companies that  
                                                     
 266. Take for example forget.me, an online service for locating and submitting data requests to 
Google and Bing. See FORGET.ME, https://forget.me [https://perma.cc/5YHA-PE99]. 
 267. However, even lacking PIIs, it would be unlikely that most individuals who wish to be 
“forgotten” will agree to such policy, and therefore will probably not use their services. 
 268. See Conley, supra note 264. 
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provide this service.269 It is also not implausible to expect that more 
technologies for making communication disposable will emerge.270 This 
could truly change the way we consume information, but it will still not 
be sufficient. It works better for some types of communication that we 
would fear falling into the wrong hands. But the Internet is comprised, 
and will most likely continue to be comprised, of vast amounts of  
information not posted by us, but rather by third parties. This information 
will not rely on these technologies, as it is designed to remain on the  
Internet. 
Finally, we have social norms. Living in an all-knowing society 
with unlimited access to information could change opinions of  
individuals on search information. Under this argument, a cognitive  
adjustment in our view of search results will occur, and individuals will 
accept that almost everyone will have negative results when searching 
someone’s name.271 The assumption under the social norms modality is 
that if society accepts that everyone has a skeleton in his or her closet, 
the Internet closet, that is, then information will not negatively impact 
anyone’s reputation. If an employer screens a candidate for hiring online 
and notices a few embarrassing photos, it would not impact his chances 
of getting the job, as “everyone has a few of those.” But while such  
cognitive adjustment would be difficult to measure, it will most likely 
take time for individuals to make such an adjustment, if they do at all. 
Moreover, it will not apply to all individuals. Mr. González, for example, 
will likely still wish that his social security debts disappeared from the 
Internet. 
B. Restraining Judicial Power 
Technology, the market, and social norms are limited in achieving 
what the EU regulators are trying to achieve. The law, as the last  
modality of regulating behavior, was chosen by the EU to regulate the 
almost-never-forgetting Internet. But the usage of the law here is  
misguided, as it incorporates search engines as part of the judicial  
                                                     
 269. For example, reputation.com,  
employs advanced techniques and technologies to help push the content you want to see 
higher up the search engine pages, whilst effectively pushing the detrimental content  
beyond page 1. Typically, people don’t search past page 1 on Google, so by pushing  
negative content to subsequent pages, people see a true reflection of your online  
reputation. 
See Reputation.com, Out with the Old and in with the New, http://uk.reputation.com/suppress-
misleading-search-results [https://perma.cc/3AQ9-N88C]. 
 270. See TigerText, supra note 257. 
 271. For an explanation of such hypothetical cognitive adjustment, see Rustad & Kulevska, 
supra note 72, at 385. 
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system. That is, if we choose the law to achieve the results of the right to 
be delisted, we need to scrutinize the most appropriate method to protect 
it.272 
The primary normative claim of this Article is that privatization of 
the judiciary is highly dangerous for any democratic society. Search  
engines should not be placed as judge and jury to decide and balance  
between competing fundamental rights. States that wish to protect  
individuals against the negative consequences of the Internet should use 
regulation, with or without other modalities, in a different manner. 
The first suggestion is to completely remove search engines from 
any judicial position in the process of delisting or forgetting. Such  
decisions should be made only by qualified judicial authorities or a  
regulator with judicial capabilities and special expertise,273 not search 
engines or any other for-profit commercial entities. The judicial role 
should be taken by either current DPAs or state courts. It is also plausible 
that states will create new administrative agencies that will be tasked 
with the responsibility of dealing with such requests. 
The counterargument rests mainly on economic grounds. It will be 
highly impractical for such bodies to deal with the large amount of  
removal requests274 and, therefore, will not only be impractical, but will 
lead to suboptimal protection of privacy and data protection rights. I do 
not take such economic considerations lightly. If the state is unable to 
deal with such a high volume of requests, then it is not necessarily wise 
to place it in a position of safeguarding such rights. What I suggest,  
however, is that search engines will be responsible, at least partially, to 
fund the operation of such judicial bodies. Generally, I would vote 
against a practice in which nongovernmental entities fund operation of 
governmental services as it is inherently flawed.275 It is the state which is 
                                                     
 272. See Wright, supra note 157, at 404 (suggesting that other legal instruments, e.g., common 
law privacy, nondefamation, confidentiality, emotional distress damages rights, and  
criminal expungement statutes, jointly provide a better alternative to the right to be forgotten). 
 273. Heather Greenfield, CCIA’s Response to European Court of Justice Online Privacy  
Ruling, CCIA (May 13, 2014), http://www.ccianet.org/2014/05/ccias-response-to-european-court-of-
justice-online-privacy-ruling [https://perma.cc/WHV5-QM7Z] (“[D]ecision about what is and is not 
in the public interest should be taken by qualified judges, not private censorship departments, which 
this ruling requires.”). 
 274. Cf. Jonathan Zittrain, Righting the Right to Be Forgotten, FUTURE OF THE INTERNET BLOG 
(July 14, 2014), http://blogs.harvard.edu/futureoftheinternet/2014/07/14/righting-the-right-to-be-
forgotten [https://perma.cc/9ET6-4QWB] (arguing “[i]f Google can process 70,000 requests, so can 
and should the data protection authorities”). 
 275. Funding from the public for state services actually occurs in the United States. In 2015, 
the Orleans Public Defenders (OPD) which are Constitutionally-required to provide legal  
representation in New Orleans, launched a crowdfunding campaign to raise money. See OPD 
Launches Crowdfunding Campaign to Meet Funding Gap, OPD (Sept. 14, 2015), 
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tasked with funding such operations. But we can also borrow from the 
polluter pays principle in environmental law.276 Search engines  
figuratively “pollute” the Internet. They are creating harm, which could 
be viewed as an externality, and they should, thereby, internalize the full 
social cost of their activity. While they can prevent pollution on their 
own (like they do currently), they could also pay someone else to stop or 
reduce pollution. Thus, they can fund, partially or fully, the operation of 
a governmental agency which handles removal requests. 
While this Article supports the implementation of the first  
suggestion, which will cease the privatization of the judiciary, the EU is 
unlikely to retract from the current application of the right to be delisted. 
This Article therefore suggests how the EU, and any other state which 
enacts a right to be delisted, should better deal with it by restraining the 
judicial powers of search engines. 
Restraining the judicial power of search engines under the right to 
be delisted should begin with transparency and oversight. Generally, if 
search engines remain in the position of judges, then transparency and 
oversight are a necessity.277 We must be more informed on the process, 
about requests, and about the decisions that search engines make.  
Arguably, such transparency will undermine the rationales of the right to 
be delisted.278 But such assumption is false. There are many ways of 
achieving transparency and still achieving the purpose behind the right to 
be delisted. 
I begin with a few general recommendations. The delisting process 
should be more centralized. There is no necessity, and, in fact, it is  
economically inefficient, to have a decentralized removal process, in 
which every search engine runs its own services and makes decentralized 
decisions. Many of these URLs could appear in more than one search 
engine. Therefore, a standardized, online web form could be a proper 
                                                                                                                       
http://www.opdla.org/news-and-events/media-coverage/286-opd-launches-crowdfunding-campaign-
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 276. For an analysis of such principle, see generally Michael J. Gergen, The Failed Promise of 
the “Polluter Pays” Principle: An Economic Analysis of Landowner Liability for Hazardous Waste, 
69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 624 (1994); Eric Thomas Larson, Why Environmental Liability Regimes in the 
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(L 169) 1. 
 277. Jan Philipp Albrecht, a leading data protection MEP, stated, “We could be clear in the 
regulation that companies cannot just makes these decisions without some sort of independent  
oversight.” See Jennifer Baker, Right to Be Forgotten? That’s Not Google’s Call—Data MEP  
Albrecht, REGISTER (Jan. 7, 2015), http://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/01/07/ 
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 278. See Letter from Peter Fleischer, supra note 83. 
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solution for this problem.279 A step further would be to create a forum in 
which search engines can share their knowledge and expertise from the 
process. Second, website owners under a removal request should also 
play a part in the process. It should be guaranteed that they would have 
the opportunity to review requests and potentially dispute claims. Such a 
move will increase transparency, reduce the problems of lack of  
procedural safeguards, and could shed more light on requests by,  
e.g., providing context to the information. 
Now for specific recommendations. First, I propose that publishing 
decisions with PII could be part of the process. Naturally, that would be 
the worst fear of the framers of the right to be delisted. But search  
engines could publish the requests with PII for a limited time period, 
granting any interested party time to partake in the debate. Under such an 
approach, the right to be delisted is more forward looking in the sense 
that only limited harm is imposed when such requests will be available 
for a short time period before removal. I am aware, however, that such 
approach will not only fail to sufficiently advance transparency,280 but 
could also undermine the rationale behind the right to be delisted.281 Such 
an approach, thus, is not obligatory. 
Regulators should next consider allowing the publishing of requests 
without PII.282 Webmasters that receive notice from search engines 
should have the opportunity to publish the requests that they received, 
stripped of PII.283 In that way, we simultaneously notify individuals in 
                                                     
 279. Edward Lee offers a solution to few of the problems of the right to be forgotten and 
Google’s role in it. He first proposes to create a standardized online web form for individuals to 
make one right to be forgotten request. Lee argues that such standardization would reduce the time 
and hassle of filing separate requests, provide each claim to a second and third pair of eyes, and 
thereby improve the examination of the applications and improve oversight of decisions. See Lee, 
supra note 10, at 53–59. 
 280. Considering the large volumes of removal requests in the EU thus far and the number of 
search engines, it would be highly implausible to assert that such limited-time clause will actually be 
actionable and, thus, transparency here is highly limited. 
 281. While publishing the removal requests for a limited time could strike as a good solution 
for transparency, it might be proven harmful for the right to be delisted. First, because in many 
times, publishing the request made, even for a short while, places focus on the requester and thereby 
might lead to the before-mentioned “Streisand effect.” But perhaps mostly, it would enable  
third-parties to collect such requests and create a timeless database of all data subjects which could 
operate outside the EU. 
 282. The Working Party addressed the possibility of transparency, and stated that a practice of 
providing information to the public regarding delisted links could only be acceptable “if the  
information is presented in such a way that users cannot, in any case, conclude that one particular 
individual has asked for de-listing of results concerning him or her.” See Working Party, supra note 
54, at 3. 
 283. Such market-based solution has already begun in some websites. For example, Wikimedia 
Foundation, which operates Wikipedia, began listing such requests. See Notices Received from 
Search Engines, WIKIMEDIA FOUNDATION, https://wikimediafoundation.org/wiki/ 
Notices_received_from_search_engines [https://perma.cc/658V-3Z98; Tom Goldstein, Somewhat 
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society and affected third parties. To address the decentralization  
problem, meaning that users cannot be expected to examine all websites 
to find out which links were asked to be removed, such an initiative 
should be more centralized as it is with the Lumen project.284 However, 
this practice, while important, is hardly enough in terms of practicality. 
Aside from the notion that such a practice could be viewed as  
undermining the rationales behind the right to be delisted, in many  
instances it would be fairly easy to understand from the URL which  
individual made the request, and it will be almost impossible for third 
parties to assess the decisions without information. But in most instances, 
the problem will be the converse; it will be almost impossible to examine 
such requests without PII and without context. If Mr. González’s request 
would have been published without PII and without a link to the article, 
we would simply see a notice like: A Spanish national requested Google 
Spain to delist results relating to social security debts that were resolved, 
and thus outdated and irrelevant. What can we really learn from such a 
request and from Google’s decision in this matter? Not much. 
A solution could arise, which will safeguard other fundamental 
rights, by finding a middle ground between protecting the privacy rights 
of individuals and ensuring proper transparency. Such middle ground 
could take the form of contextual privacy.285 While it is evident that  
publishing the “removed” webpages or the requests for removal, even 
without PII, could still endanger privacy, an impartial third party could 
play a role in oversight.286 This could take two forms. The first is an 
oversight on the judicial process. Under this form of oversight, a third 
party will examine all requests made and all decisions by the data  
controllers. It could be done in either real time or over time. Such third 
party, while exposed to the requests made, is not violating privacy, as it 
only views such requests in the context of examining them. It is noted 
that such a mechanism is not economically efficient, and such third party 
                                                                                                                       
Significant Settlement, SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 7, 2005, 8:54 PM), http://web.archive.org/web/ 
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 285. See generally HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND 
THE INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE (2009). 
 286. Edward Lee suggests that oversight should be conducted by a newly formed “hybrid 
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by serving as an appellate body for removal decisions. See Lee, supra note 10, at 53–59. 
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should have the judicial role of deciding, but if the EU insists on placing 
the judicial role on search engines, then such oversight is crucial. Such 
third party will not only serve as an oversight mechanism in specific  
cases, but will enable the development of the law. In such review  
mechanisms, the third party will be able to make recommendations to the 
regulator on how the shape regulations and guidelines. Unlike the first 
form, recommendations here are more general, and not individual. 
The second form of recommendation relates to the practice of 
delisting. Currently in the EU, removal is almost perpetual. When search 
engines decide to delist, the content will most likely remain delisted,  
unless further action is taken by the website that holds the information. I 
suggest that removal should not be perpetual under any circumstances. 
Search engines like Google must not only provide mechanisms to delist, 
but also a mechanism to relist. While this recommendation is more of a 
general criticism on the right to be delisted, and not on specifically the 
privatization of the judiciary, it is highly important to emphasize it as the 
roles of search engines as judicial bodies enhances this problem. There 
are three arguments which support obliging such “relisting” provision. 
The first argument relates to unjustified removals. Unjustified  
removal is a crucial element for protecting human rights and liberties, 
especially when search engines receive large numbers of requests and 
could possibly become overinclusive in their decisions. Even with  
oversight, mistakes are inevitable. Therefore, any regulator should  
necessitate a reversal mechanism, which would allow relisting content. 
The second reason relates to the nature of information. What was 
once “inadequate” and/or “irrelevant” could change over time.287  
Inadequacy is relative term, subject to change by its nature. Irrelevancy 
is similar in that sense. Information about an unknown individual could 
become highly relevant if she is suddenly running for office. The  
opposite could also occur. Once public does not mean always public.288 
If a search engine refused to delist results for someone who is currently a 
public figure, it does not mean that such individual will not become a 
private figure in the future and will thereby gain a right to delist some 
links.289 
                                                     
 287. Leta Ambrose, supra note 14, at 408 (“Generally, there is no way for researchers to know 
what information will be relevant, useful, or valuable until time has passed.”); Zittrain, supra note 
274 (“[S]omething that was once relevant could become irrelevant over time . . . .”). 
 288. See Briscoe v. Reader’s Digest Association, 4 Cal.3d 529, 539 (1971) (“It would be a 
crass legal fiction to assert that a matter once public never becomes private again.”). 
 289. It is debatable whether such scenario is problematic under the right to be delisted. In such 
scenario, the previously-public figure—now a private figure—could simply file another removal 
request. However, as search engines might use the previous decision to repeat the decision, some 
reassurance that decisions are made interdependently are also crucial. 
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Third and finally, relisting ensures the integrity of history. If we set 
expiration dates on search engines decisions—not data—we reduce the 
negative impact on human rights and thereby the power of search  
engines to rewrite history. While human rights could still be impacted, 
the integrity of history will be reserved. 
Such reinsertion process would require changes. It would first  
necessitate transparency. Obviously, as noted previously, publishing  
information on removal requests is problematic, with or without PII.  
Beyond the need for oversight by a third party designated to review  
requests, we need an impartial third party to have accessibility to all  
requests, at all times. It requires forming a database, hidden from the 
public and only viewable for a third party tasked with such mission, to 
review decisions and re-review them over time. It could be conceived as 
a walled garden of information, meaning that only certain certified  
individuals are eligible to enter such garden thereby preserving the right.  
Accessibility could be granted to, e.g., academic researchers290 and  
human rights organizations. This approach still leaves public  
accountability concerns, as these are not public officials, but it could be 
viewed as the lesser of two evils by the public. 
Any removal process must also contain a misuse provision.  
Fraudulent requests for removal should have consequences. Without a 
misuse provision, individuals and/or companies might abuse the removal 
process. A misuse provision is mostly important when search engines are 
acting in a judicial role because their removal process is free and more 
accessible than other judiciaries, and is therefore more prone to abuse 
and misuse. This misuse provision could prove to be more difficult than 
the mechanism for improper takedowns of alleged copyrighted materials 
that currently exists under the DMCA. Under the DMCA, the targets of 
improper takedowns can file suit against the takedown senders.291 This 
DMCA misuse provision was designed to ensure that individuals will 
only file a notice-and-takedown request in appropriate cases. Indeed, the 
question of copyright infringement is not always clear, especially when 
there are various exemptions for copyright infringement like fair use,292 
which could make a supposedly valid claim of infringement erroneous. 
Nonetheless, this test is mostly objective and not similar to the right to be 
delisted. Whether the content in question is inadequate, irrelevant, or  
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excessive in relation to those purposes and in the light of the time that 
has elapsed is subjective and opened to a much broader interpretation. 
But such misuse provision could still be used against individuals 
where it is clear that their claims were intentionally deceptive. It is  
plausible to codify a misuse provision in the application of the right to be 
delisted, to ensure that search engines, the content holder whose link was 
removed, or even third parties, could take legal action against the  
individual who requested the removal. But it all goes back to the need of 
transparency. 
The final recommendation is more general to the right to be delisted 
and refers to procedural safeguards and the process of appeal. Like any 
court decision, the search engine ruling on a removal request should be 
subject to appeal. Currently in the EU, the right of appeal is reserved for 
the data subject who, upon rejection of her request, can ask the local data 
protection authority, or the relevant judicial authority, to review the 
search engine’s decision.293 The problem with this appeal system is  
twofold. First, it seems from practice that it does not work very well.294 
While people exercise their right through search engines, they are less 
inclined to do so through DPAs because they are either unaware that 
such DPAs exist295 or unaware that they possess a right to appeal.296 The 
second aspect is related to the parties that are not part of the judicial  
process. The webmaster and other individuals in society do not receive 
an appeal right. While webmasters sometimes receive notice of  
removals,297 and such notice is not only optional but also perhaps even 
illegal,298 their “appeal” is limited to asking the search engine to  
reconsider its decision. Other individuals in society do not receive any 
right of appeal. 
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Therefore, we need to form a more appropriate appeal mechanism 
for search engines decisions. If we embrace the walled garden of  
information approach, then these third party examiners will possess the 
right to file an appeal on behalf of both the third affected party and for 
the benefit of society. But unfortunately, due to the difficulties of the 
right to be delisted, in terms of its vagueness and information gaps from 
its ex-parte nature, such appeal is insufficient as a legal safeguard. While 
it is still a better practice than currently deployed in the EU, it should not 
be considered sufficient to protect fundamental rights. 
While this Article suggests few methods to better implement a right 
to be delisted, all in all, it warns against granting judicial power to search 
engines. They are part of the problem, and could also be part of the  
solution, but not as a judiciary. Judicial roles should remain in the realm 
of the state, even if it is less economically efficient. It is crucial for any 
democratic society that the rule of law will be safeguarded from potential 
abuse. It is crucial that fundamental rights be protected by the state and 
not by for-profit organizations. Such a judicial role blurs the distinctions 
between private and public—the roles of the state, and those of  
companies. 
CONCLUSION 
The e-memory revolution presents new challenges for society.  
Information could not only become perpetual but also highly accessible 
through search engines. While individuals may evaluate the right to  
privacy in different manners, it should be evident that this revolution 
may require a new evaluation of digital technology’s risks. The European  
Union’s current right to be delisted and right to be forgotten do exactly 
that, but they do it poorly. They place a form of censorship on the  
Internet, while endangering freedom speech, freedom of information, and 
freedom of the press. They are impractical to a great extent, and they 
present many challenges for search engines and regulators. 
But the main problem with those rights is normatively broader. 
They represent a dangerous path that modern societies have taken  
towards the privatization of the judiciary. What began as a quasi-judicial 
role for search engines under a notice-and-takedown regime of alleged 
copyright infringement takes a step-up under the EU’s new rights  
enforcement regime. This new form of privatization is truly unique in 
modern society. Unlike other forms of judiciary privatizations, this  
judiciary is tasked with safeguarding only certain fundamental rights. It 
shifts decisions about these fundamental rights from the public sphere. 
Not only is such privatization unique in the sense of the type of rights 
that it handles, but it also almost entirely removes democratic safeguards 
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like oversight and transparency. When search engines like Google reach 
a decision, there are only a handful of cases, out of millions of URLs, 
that the state will reexamine under an appeal process. Rule of law does 
not apply here, nor do any procedural safeguards. 
This Article argues that such privatization should not occur. While 
economic considerations could suggest otherwise, there is no room for 
privatizing the judiciary when dealing with fundamental rights. Public 
officials should be handling such requests, not search engines. If the EU 
insists on using search engines as a judiciary, they must also restrain 
their judicial power and provide adequate safeguards for society. In any 
such mechanism, policymakers must ensure proper transparency and 
oversight on search engines’ removal procedure and decisions. 
The implications of privatization of the judiciary extend far beyond 
the EU. They represent how states are coping with the threats that the 
digital era brings. Perhaps the roles of intermediaries online are  
changing, which may necessitate a reframing of their legal duties and 
responsibilities. By the same token, the threats that the digital era brings 
may also necessitate a reframing of the roles of the state and governance 
in this new digital era. What the digital era should not change is the  
protection of fundamental rights under the rule of law. If it does, the  
concept of democracy might also be forgotten. 
